Re: [Dime] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt

Steve Donovan <srdonovan@usdonovans.com> Tue, 24 March 2015 21:05 UTC

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Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 16:05:46 -0500
From: Steve Donovan <srdonovan@usdonovans.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dime] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt
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A few comments on this document.

I would suggest adding the following requirement -- The solution MUST 
ensure that routing AVPs are always sent in the clear.

Requirement 5 does indicate that not all AVPs are covered by the " 
cryptographic protection".  I think it would be better to be clear that 
there is a set of AVPs that MUST NOT be encrypted.

In addition, the following requirement might be useful -- The solution 
MUST support the ability to identify other non routing AVPs that must 
always be sent in the clear.

This would be to cover overload, load, message priority and other AVPs 
that need to be accessible by all nodes in the path of a transaction.

Regards,

Steve

On 1/26/15 9:03 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>   This draft is a work item of the Diameter Maintenance and Extensions Working Group of the IETF.
>
>          Title           : Diameter AVP Level Security End-to-End Security: Scenarios and Requirements
>          Authors         : Hannes Tschofenig
>                            Jouni Korhonen
>                            Glen Zorn
>                            Kervin Pillay
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02.txt
> 	Pages           : 9
> 	Date            : 2015-01-26
>
> Abstract:
>     This specification discusses requirements for providing Diameter
>     security at the level of individual Attribute Value Pairs.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-02
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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