Re: [Dime] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-dime-rfc4006bis-08: (with COMMENT)

[Yuval Lifshitz <[e-mail]>]

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    On Thursday, May 24, 2018, 4:58:44 p.m. GMT+3, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:  
 
 

On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 6:53 AM, Yuval Lifshitz <[e-mail]> wrote:

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    On Thursday, May 24, 2018, 4:18:06 p.m. GMT+3, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:  
 
 

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 11:33 PM, Yuval Lifshitz <[e-mail]> wrote:

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    On Thursday, May 24, 2018, 6:41:17 a.m. GMT+3, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:  
 
 Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dime-rfc4006bis-08: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Rich version of this review at:
https://mozphab-ietf. devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3353


I only gave this a light read. Some minor comments below.

COMMENTS
S 1.2.
>        deduction of credit from the end user account when service is
>        completed and refunding of reserved credit that is not used.
>  
>      Diameter Credit-control Server  A Diameter credit-control server acts
>        as a prepaid server, performing real-time rating and credit-
>        control.  It is located in the home domain and is accessed by

a definition of "home domain" would be useful

[yuval] base spec define "home realm" we should probably change to that

S 2.
>      credit-control application.
>  
>      When an end user requests services such as SIP or messaging, the
>      request is typically forwarded to a service element (e.g., SIP Proxy)
>      in the user's home domain.  In some cases it might be possible that
>      the service element in the visited domain can offer services to the

also define visited domain, or at least point to a reference.

[yuval] base spec defined "local realm" for that. will fix

S 3.1.
>                                  [ CC-Correlation-Id ]
>                                  [ User-Equipment-Info ]
>                                  [ User-Equipment-Info-Extension ]
>                                  *[ Proxy-Info ]
>                                  *[ Route-Record ]
>                                  *[ AVP ]

Please expand AVP on first use.

[yuval] it is in the base spec

I'm sure it is, but you should still expand it. 
[yuval] sure we can (it would be a bit awkward though, in the world of "Diameter" it will be like explaining what TCP stands for...)

https://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=7322#section-3.6
[yuval] in the list, but not marked as "well known". OTOH, that document gives some freedom to the RFC editor. Given that the first couple of occurrences of AVP in the spec are in titles and inside ABNF, there isn't a reasonable place to expand that. If someone tries to read any Diameter application spec, without the base one they would probably run into other issues as well



S 4.
>      control client requests credit authorization from the credit-control
>      server prior to allowing any service to be delivered to the end user.
>  
>      In the first model, the credit-control server rates the request,
>      reserves a suitable amount of money from the user's account, and
>      returns the corresponding amount of credit resources.  Note that

Sorry, reserves the balance or the amount reserved?

[yuval] not sure what is not clear?

As I said above, do you return the balance or do you return the amount of credit that has been reserved.
[yuval] return the reserved amount

OK, the text should say it.
[yuval] ok. will rephrase

-Ekr






S 14.
>  
>      Even without any modification to the messages, an adversary can
>      eavesdrop on transactions that contain privacy-sensitive information
>      about the user.  Also, by monitoring the credit-control messages one
>      can collect information about the credit-control server's billing
>      models and business relationships.

I'm having trouble reading these two paragraphs. Are they about what
happens if TLS isn't used?

[yuval] will clarify. see here: https://github.com/ lbertz02/rfc4006bis/issues/51

This doesn't seem dramatically clearer. What sort of an adversary can do that?
[yuval] in some cases e2e security is not possible, this is what this section is addressing, the github issue is to clarify that

-Ekr






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