[Dime] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: (with COMMENT)

"Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> Wed, 01 June 2016 15:23 UTC

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Subject: [Dime] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: (with COMMENT)
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Ben Campbell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-04: No Objection

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- I am concerned about the de-emphasis of privacy requirements. While
there's a mention of confidentiality in Requirement 2, other text
suggests that integrity is more important (implying privacy is less
important). There are no privacy considerations. Finally, the  {AVP}k
convention does not distinguish  hinders discussion about how the set of
confidentiality-protected AVPs and integrity-protected AVPs might not be
the same. [Note: I almost balloted DISCUSS over this point. I did not,
because I don't want to force the working group to add requirements it
doesn't believe in. But I'd like to see some discussion about this.]

- The "middle to *" models may be useful, but they are not end-to-end.
Given the focus on those models, I find the title of the draft to border
on disinformation. The description in the introduction about protecting
AVPs between "non-neighbor" nodes is more accurate.

- I find it odd to find 2119 keywords in the "motivation" sections. I
suspect that most of those are statements of fact. If some are really
requirements, they should be presented as such.

- 4: The listed advantages of the middle-middle model (and also
middle-to-end and end-to-middle) seem to assume that the number of
"middles" is smaller than the number of "ends". While this may be true,
especially for clienty ends, it should probably be explicitly stated.

-- "firewalling Diameter proxy" needs a definition or reference.

- Requirement 1: Does this need discussion on deprecating algorithms when
vulnerabilities become known?

- Requirement 2: Please elaborate on backwards-compatibiltiy with
existing applications. Is this intended to motivate the models with

- Requirement 7: This (along with some text in the introduction) implies
that non-repudiation is a requirement. If so, that should be listed and
elaborated as a requirement.

Editorial and Nits:

- 1, first paragraph: "mechanisms independent of Diameter (e.g., IPsec)
   is used."


- Requirement 3: The last sentence seems to ask the reader to draw a
conclusion that wall-clock time can be used for anti-replay protection.
If that's the intent, please say so explicitly.