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Diameter Overload Indication Conveyance

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Abstract

This specification documents a Diameter Overload Control (DOC) base solution and the dissemination of the overload report information.

Requirements

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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Diameter-layer

Diameter layer Load Balancing:

Diameter layer load balancing allows Diameter requests to be distributed across the set of servers. Definition of this function is outside the scope of this document.

Load Management:

This functionality ensures that the consolidated load state for
the server farm is collected, and processed. The exact algorithm
for computing the load at the SFE is implementation specific but
enough semantic of the conveyed load information needs to be
specified so that deterministic behavior can be ensured.

The SFE is the entity that understands the consolidated overload
state for the server farm. Just as it is outside the scope of
this document to specify how a Diameter server calculates its
specify how an SFE calculates the overload state for the set of
servers. This document describes how the SFE communicates

Topology Hiding:

Topology Hiding is loosely defined as ensuring that no Diameter topology information about the server farm can be discovered from Diameter messages sent outside a predefined boundary (typically an administrative domain). This includes obfuscating identifiers and address information of Diameter entities in the server farm. It can also include hiding the number of various Diameter entities in the server farm. Identifying information can occur in many Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs), including Origin-Host, Destination-Host, Route-Record, Proxy-Info, Session-ID and other AVPs.

Server Farm Identity Management:

Server Farm Identity Management (SFIM) is a mechanism that can be used by the SFE to present a single Diameter identity that can be used by clients to send Diameter requests to the server farm. This requires that the SFE modifies Origin Host information in answers coming from servers in the server farm. An agent that performs SFIM appears as a server from the client's perspective.

Throttling:

Throttling

Throttling:

Throttling is the reduction of the number of requests sent to an entity. Throttling can include a client dropping requests, or an agent rejecting requests with appropriate error responses. Clients and agents can also choose to redirect throttled requests to some other entity or entities capable of handling them.

Reporting Node

A Diameter node that generates an overload report. (This may or may not be the actually overloaded node.)

Reacting Node

A Diameter node that consumes and acts upon a report. Note that "act upon" does not necessarily mean the reacting node applies an abatement algorithm; it might decide to delegate that downstream, in which case it also becomes a "reporting node".

OLR Overload Report.

3. Solution Overview

3.1. Architectural Assumptions

This section describes the high-level architectural and semantic assumptions that $\frac{underly}{underlie}$ the Diameter Overload Control Mechanism.

3.1.1. Application Classification

The following is a classification of Diameter applications and requests. This discussion is meant to document factors that play into decisions made by the Diameter identity responsible for handling overload reports.

Section 8.1 of [RFC6733] defines two state machines that imply two types of applications, session-less and eccesion based, session-based applications. The primary differentiator difference between these types of applications is the lifetime of

Session IDs. Session-Ids.

For session-based applications, the **session-id** Session-Id is used to tie multiple requests into a single session.

In session-less applications, the lifetime of the session-id Session-Id is a single Diameter 4 application application. The following, copied from section 7.1.4 of 29.272, plicitly states that sessions are implicitly terminated and that not maintain session state: MME and the HSS and b SGSN and the HSS and the MME and transaction, i.e. the EIR, Diamet be implicitly An implicitly terminated session is one for which th not maintain state information. The client shall n wer does implementation of implicitly terminated As after a consequen on single Diameter transaction and the cli termination a new Session-Id is generated for each Diameter request. Neither For the purposes of this discussion, session-less applications are further divided into two types of applications: Stateless applications: Requests within a stateless application have no relationship to each other. The 3GPP defined S13 application is an example of a stateless application. [3GPP.29.272], where only a Diameter command is defined between a client and a server and no state is maintained between two consecutive transactions. Pseudo-session applications: While this class of application does applications that do not use rely on the Diameter Session ID Session-Id AVP to correlate d ordering for correlation of transac defined by application messages related to the application. same session but use other session-related information for this purpose. The 3GPP defined Cx application [reference] [3GPP.29.229] is an example of a pseudo-session application. that all reque f Ot ypically need to go to the same ver? The act trol Credit-Control application defined in [RFC4006] are examples is an example of a Diameter session-based applications. application. The handling of overload reports must take the type of application into consideration, as discussed in Section 3.1.2 3.1.2. Application Type Overload Implications This section discusses considerations for mitigating overload reported by a Diameter entity. This discusses considerations for matrix of application. Section 3.1.3 discusses considerations for handling various request types when the target server is known to be in an overloaded state. 8 These discussions assume that the strategy for mitigating the reported overload is to reduce the overall workload sent to the overloaded entity. The concept of applying overload treatment to requests targeted for an overloaded Diameter entity is inherent to this discussion. The method used to reduce offered load is not specified here but could include routing requests to another Diameter entity known to be able to handle them, or it could mean rejecting certain requests. For a Diameter agent, rejecting requests will usually mean generating appropriate Diameter error responses. For a

Stateless applications:

By definition there is no relationship between individual requests in a stateless application. As a result, when a request is sent or relayed to an overloaded Diameter entity - either a Diameter Server or a Diameter Agent - the sending or relaying entity can choose to apply the overload treatment to any request targeted for the overloaded entity.

Diameter client, rejecting requests will depend upon the application. For example, it could mean giving an indication to the entity requesting the Diameter service that the network is busy and to try

Pseudo stateful

again later.

Pseudo-session applications: Pseudo stateful applications are also stateless applications in that For pseudo-session applications, there is no session Diameter state

maintained between transactions. There is, however, an implied ordering of requests. As a result, decisions about which transactions to reject as a result of requests towards an overloaded entity to reject could take the <u>command code</u> command code of the request into consideration. This generally means that transactions later in the sequence of transactions should be given more favorable treatment than messages earlier in the sequence. This is because more work has already been done by the Diameter network for those transactions that occur later in the sequence. Rejecting them could result in increasing the load on the network as the transactions earlier in the sequence might also need to be repeated.

Stateful

Session-based applications:

Overload handling for stateful session-based applications must take into consideration the work load associated with setting up an and maintaining a session. As such, the entity handling overload of a sending requests towards an overloaded Diameter entity for a stateful session-based application might tend to reject new session requests before prior to rejecting intra-session requests. In addition, session ending requests might be given a lower priority of being rejected as rejecting session ending requests could result in session status being out of sync between the Diameter clients and servers. Nodes

Application designers that would decide to reject mid-session requests will need to consider whether the rejection invalidates the session, session and any resulting session clean-up that may be required. procedures.

3.1.3. Request Transaction Classification

Independent Request:

An independent request is not a part of a Diameter section correlated to any other requests and, as such, the lifetime of the session-id is constrained to an individual transaction.

Session-Initiating Request:

A session-initiating request is the initial message that establishes a Diameter session. The ACR message defined in [RFC6733] is an example of a session-initiating request.

Correlated Session-Initiating Request:

There are cases, most cases when multiple session-initiated requests must be correlated and managed by the same Diameter server. It is notably the case in the 3GPP PCC architecture, architecture [3GPP.23.203], where multiple apparently independent Diameter application sessions are actually correlated and must be handled by the same Diameter server. This is a special case of a Session-Initiating Request. Gx CCR-I requests and Rx AAR messages are examples of correlated sessioninitiating requests.

[OpenIssue: The previous paragraph needs references.]

Intra-Session Request:

An intra session request is a request that uses **the same Session-Id than the one used in** a session id for an already established **previous** request. An intra session request generally needs to be delivered to the server that handled the session creating request for the session. The STR message defined in [RFC6733] is an example of an intra-session requests. CCR-U and CCR-U requests defined in [RFC4006] are further examples of intra-session requests.

Pseudo-Session Requests: Pseudo session

Pseudo-session requests are independent requests and, as such, and do not use the request transactions same Session-Id but are not tied together using correlated by other session-related information contained in the Diameter session-id. request. There exist exists Diameter applications that define an expected ordering of transactions. This sequencing of independent transactions results in a pseudo session. The AIR, MAR and SAR requests in the 3GPP defined Cx application are examples of pseudo-session requests.

3.1.4. Request Type Overload Implications

The request classes identified in Section 3.1.3 have implications on decisions about which requests should be throttled first. The following list of request treatment regarding throttling is provided as guidelines for application designers when implementing the Diameter overload control mechanism described in this document. Exact behavior regarding throttling must be defined per application.

Independent requests:

Independent requests can be given equal treatment when making

throttling decisions.

Session-creating

Session-initiating requests: Session-creating

Session-initiating requests represent more work than independent or intra-session requests. Moreover, session-initiated requests are typically followed by other related session-related requests. As such, as the main objective of the overload control is to reduce the total number of requests sent to the overloaded entity, throttling decisions might favor intra-session requests over session-ereating session-initiating requests. Individual session-creating session-initiating requests can be given equal treatment when making throttling decisions.

Correlated session creating session-initiating requests:

A Request that results in a new binding, where the binding is used for routing of subsequent consion creating requests, session-initiating requests to the same server, represents more work load than other requests. As such, these requests might be throttled more frequently than other

Pseudo-session requests:

request types.

Throttling decisions for pseudo-session requests can take where individual requests fit into the overall sequence of requests within the pseudo session. Requests that are earlier in the sequence might be throttled more aggressively than requests that occur later in the sequence.

Intra-session requests

There are two classes of intra-sessions requests. The first is a request class consists of requests that ends terminate a session. The second st one contains the set of requests that is are used to een by the Diameter client and server, server to maintain the ongoing session state. Session ending request terminating requests should be throttled less aggressively in order to keep session msistent between gracefully terminate sessions, allow clean-up of the client related resources (e.g. session state) and possibly reduce get rid of the essions need for other intra-session requests, reducing the session managements impact on the overloaded entity. The default handling of other intra-session requests might be to treat them equally when making throttling decisions. There might also be application level considerations whether some request types are favored over others. 3.1.5. Diameter Deployment Scenario This section discusses various Agent Behaviour In the context of the Diameter network de scenarios Overload Indication Conveyance (DOIC) and reacting to the implications overload information, the functional behaviour of the dels Diameter agents in front of servers, especially Diameter proxies, needs to be common. This is important because agents may actively participate in the handling of an overload rep vary conditions. For example. they may make intelligent next hop selection decisions based on the following overload conditions, or absen of aggregate overload information to be disseminated downstream. Diameter agents t may have other deployment related tasks that are not defined in the DOG t Diameter base protocol [RFC6733]. These include, among other tasks, topology hiding, or agent acting as a Server Front End (SFE) for a farm of Diameter servers. Since the solution defined in this specification must not break the network Diameter e ty of base protocol [RFC6733] at any time, great care has to be taken not to assume functionality from the Diameter server deployment. break base protocol behavior, or to assume agent functionality beyond for agents that would the Diameter base protocol. Effectively this means the following from a Diameter ion agent: app] applications supported by Diameter clients and If a Diameter ser o Number of Di ideration for which elem ents support agent presents itself as the DOC extension, "end node", as an agent acting as an topology hiding SFE, the following agent is a representative list the final destination of deploy Cliont - Multiple equivalent serve

- - - - - - - - - - - Multiple equivalent servers

- o Client --- Agent [--- Agent] --- Partitioned server

- - - - --- Session Correlating Agent --- Multiple Equivalent

- The following is the corresponding answers and server-initiated requests. As a list consequence, the DOIC mechanism MUST NOT leak information of representative DOC deployment scenarios.
- O Direct connection between a DOC client and the Diameter nodes behind it. This requirement means that such a DOC cerver

- o DOC client non DOC agent DOC server

- O Non-DOC client --- DOC acts as a back-to-back-agent for DOIC purposes. How the Diameter agent --- Mix of DOC and non-DOC in this case appears to the Diameter servers
- o DOC client --- agent --- Partitioned/Segmented DOC server
- DOC client ---- agent ---- in the farm, is specific to the implementation and deployment within the realm the Diameter agent ---- Partitioned/Segmented DOC server is deployed.
- o DOC client --- edge agent --- edge agent --- DOC server

3.1.6. Diameter Agent Behaviour

the Diameter Overload Indication Conveyance (DOIC) dialogue is established between clients and reacting to the servers and any overload information, information received by a client would be from

the functional behaviour of Diameter agents in front of serve

 Diameter agents in front of servers, especially Diameter proxies, needs to be common. This is important because agents may actively

- participate server identified by the Origin-Host identity contained in the handling of an overload conditions. For example, they may make intelligent next hop selection decisions based on

overload conditions, or aggregate overload information to be

disseminated downstream.

Diameter agents may have other deployment

related tasks that are not defined in message.


3.1.6. Simplified Example Architecture

Figure 1 illustrates the simplified architecture for Diameter base protocol

- [RFC6733]. These include, among other tasks, topology hiding, and — acting as a server front end
- overload information conveyance. See Section 5.1 for a server farm of real more discussion and details how different Diameter

corvora.

Since nodes fit into the colution defined in this specification must not break architecture from the DOIC point of view.



In Figure 1, the Diameter overload indication can be conveyed (1) end-to-end between servers and clients or $\frac{1}{10-2352}$ (2) between servers and

Diameter agent functionality beyond inside the Diameter base protocol. Effectively this means realm and then between the following from a Dia agent: o If a Diameter agent presents itself as and the "end node", perhaps clients when the Diameter agent acting as an topology hiding SFE, back-to-back-agent for DOIC purposes. 3.2. Conveyance of the DOC m MUST NOT leak zhan: ion Overload Indication The following sections describe new Diameter AVPs used for sending overload reports, and for declaring support for certain DOIC features. 3.2.1. DOIC Capability Discovery Support of DOIC may be specified as part of the functionality From application. In this way, support of the supported by a new Diameter ne considered Diameter client point application (discovered during capabilities exchange phase as defined in Diameter base protocol [RFC6733]) indicates implicit support of view the fin equests and DOIC mechanism. When the ce for DOIC mechanism is introduced in existing Diameter applications, a specific capability discovery mechanism is required. "DOIC capability discovery mechanism" is based on the answers The be presence of specific optional AVPs in the Diameter agent. This ment means that messages, such a Diameter acts as a b low the agent appears +o 0C-Feature-Vector AVP (see Section 4.1). Although the OC-Feature-Vector AVP can be used to advertise a certain set of new or existing Diameter modes overload control capabilities, it is represent wment specific within versioning and not a depl solution per se, however, it can be used to achieve the realm same result. From the Diameter agent overload control functionality point of view, the "Reacting node" is deployed. nt also implies that if the Diameter mpersonate requester of the servers behind it, overload report information and the Diameter dialogue "Reporting node" is established between clients and servers and any overload information received by a client would be from a given ser identified by the Origin Host identity. discussed multiple situations (OpenIssue where an agent might insert an OLR. I don perform topology hiding or SFIM provider of the overload report. The OC-Feature-Vector AVP in order to do so. We cannot assur an OLR the request message is always "from" or "abou the section seer ssume that topology hiding agents act interpreted as b2b overload topology hiding agen an announcement of "DOIC supported capabilities". The OC-Feature-Vector AVP in the right abstraction. It's possible that topology ents must do this, think we can preclude hiding agents from answer is also doing it, interpreted as a report of "DOIC supported capabilities" and at least some one of supported capabilities MUST be common with the time.] 1.7. Cimplified Example Architecture Riguro 1 illustratos the chitecture for "Reacting node" (see Section 4.1). 3.3. Overload Condition Indication Diameter nodes can request a reduction in offered load by indicating e condition in the form of an overload report. The an overload 😁 discussion overload report contains information about how different much load should be reduced, and may contain other information about the overload condition. This information is conveyed in Diameter modes fit to Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs). Certain new AVPs may also be used to declare certain DOIC capabilities and extensions. 4. Attribute Value Pairs This section describes the archite ture from encoding and semantics of the Diameter Overload Indication Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) defined in this document. 4.1. OC-Feature-Vector AVP The OC-Feature-Vector AVP (AVP code TBD1) is type of Grouped and contains the description of supported DOIC Other Realma IDie

Server B - Overla ad Indicati 1) standard base end Overload Indication 21 col Figure 1: Simplified architectur erload indication delivery ee features of the Over used for AVP sending principle) mplish. node. OC-Feature-Vector ::= < AVP Header: TBD1 > < OC-Sequence-Number > [OC-Features] * [AVP] The " liation" OC-Sequence-Number AVP is based on used to indicate whether the existe e contents of specie as the OC-Feature-Vector AVP (see Section 4.1. Although has changed since last time the OC-Feature-Vector AVP can be used to adverti capabilities, it emitting node announced its DOIC features and capabilities (see Section 4.4). The OC-Features AVP is not a ver, it can be used to achieve announced the same result. tion DOC features supported by the DOIC endpoint, in the form of a Flag bits field in which each bit announces one feature or capability supported by the Attribute Value Pairs node (see Section 4.2). The Diameter overload control APVs SH always ptional AVPs. This requirement stems from absence of the fact OC-Features AVP indicates that piggybacking overload control information existing of pplication cannot really use AVPs with only the M-bit set. However, certain exceptions as explained default traffic abatement algorithm described in Section 5.4. werload control functionality point this specification is always supported. A reacting node includes this AVP to indicate its capabilities to a reporting node. For example, the requester of endpoint (reacting node) may indicate which (future defined) traffic abatement algorithms it supports in addition to the overload report and default. During the "Reporting node" is message exchange the provider overload control endpoints express their common set of supported capabilities. The reacting node includes the overload port, OC-Feature-Vector AVP that announces what it supports. The eve load report -or reporting node that sends the cape nformation in answer also includes the request message is alway ent of a ability", OC-Feature-Vector AVP that describe the capabilities it supports. The overload set of capabilities advertised by the capability inf in reporting node depends on local policies. At least one the ensure announced capabilities MUST match mutually. If there is always interpreted no single matching capability the reacting node MUST act as a report if it does not implement DOIC and cease inserting any DOIC related AVPs into any Diameter messages with this specific reacting node. 4.2. OC-Features AVP The OC-Features AVP (AVP code TBD6) s type of support tionality Unsigned64 and as contains report 64 bit flags field of announced capabilities of an overload condition (of a status Overload Condition Indication Diameter nodes can request a reduct in offered load by indicating <u>condition</u> in the form control endpoint. The value of an overload report. zero (0) is reserved.

The

overload report contains information about how much load should be

reduced, and may contain other information about following capabilities are defined in this document:

OLR DEFAULT ALGO (0x00000000000000)

When this flag is set by the overload l in Diameter Attribute Value dition. This Pairs (AVPs).

Certain new AVPs may also be used to declare certain DOIC capabilities and extensions.

Attribute Value Pairs

ection describes control endpoint it means that the encoding and semantics of Overload

Indication Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs).

OC Feature Vector default traffic abatement (loss) algorithm is supported.

4.3. OC-OLR AVP

The OC F re Vector OC-OLR AVP (AVP code TBD1) TBD2) is type of Unsign 164 Grouped and contains a 64 bit necessary information to convey an overload cont dicates report. OC-OLR may also

- be used to convey additional information about an extension that the
- ies defined is

declared in this specifi

de) includes this the OC-Feature-Vector AVP.

The OC-OLR AVP does not contain explicit information to vilities to the other overload control endpoint ind le, the endnoint (reacting node) ---indicate which (future defined) traffic abatement algorithms application it

addition applies to and who inserted the default.

During AVP or whom the messa specific OC-OLR AVP concerns to. Both these information is implicitly learned from the overload control endpoints express their common set of supported capabilities. encapsulating Diameter message/command.

The endpoint sending a

- request (the reacting node) includes application the OC Feature Vector AVP with sends the answer (the reporting node) also includes the OC Feature-Vector AVP with flags set to describe the capabilities it both supports and agrees with the request sender (e.g., based on the local and/or sending endpoint onfiguration) -(the ceporting node) does not need to advertise those capabilities it is
- with the request sending endpoint (the reacting not going to node).

define any additional capability flag. This specification de The implicity capability (all flags set to zero) indicates support for this specification only.

2. OC-OLR AVP

The OC-OLR AVP (AVP code TBD2) is typ OC-OLR may al ssary information to convey an overload report. used to convey additional information

-OLR AVP does not contain explicit ation to which application it applies to and who inserted the AVP or whom the

plicitly learned from the encapoulating Diameter message/command, e application the OC OLR OC-OLR AVP applies to is the same as the Application-Id found in the Diameter message header. The identity the OC-OLR AVP concerns is determined from the Origin-Host AVP (and Origin-Realm AVP as well) found from the encapsulating Diameter command.

OC-OLR := < AVP Header: TBD2 >

- < TimeStamp OC-Sequence-Number >
- [Reduction-Percentage OC-Report-Type]
- ValidityDuration OC-Reduction-Percentage] ReportType OC-Validity-Duration]
- * [AVP]

The TimeStamp Sequence-Number AVP indicates when the original OC-OLR AVP with "freshness" of the reated. OC-OLR AVP. It is possible to replay the same OC-OLR OC-OLR AVP multiple times between

the overload control endpoints, however, when the OC-OLR AVP content changes or the other information sending endpoint wants the receiving endpoint to update its overload control information, then the $\frac{\text{TimeStamp}}{\text{TimeStamp}}$ iOC-Sequence-Number AVP MUST contain a new value.

or is it just greater value than the previously received. The this possessily a time receiver SHOULD discard an OC-OLR AVP with a sequence number that can be less than previously received one.

Note that if a timest used Diameter command were to calculate expiration time? (propose no.). We should also ber is needed for consider whether either a timesta tection against replay attacks

4.3. TimeStamp contain multiple OC-OLR AVPs

they all MUST have different OC-Report-Type AVP value.

4.4. OC-Sequence-Number AVP

The TimeStamp OC-Sequence-Number AVP (AVP code TBD3) is type of Time. Unsigned64. Its usage in the context of the overload control is described in Section 4.2. Sections 4.1 and 4.3. From the functionality point of view, the TimeStamp OC-Sequence-Number AVP is merely MUST be used as a non-volatile increasing counter between two overload control endpoints.

4.4. ValidityDuration The sequence number is only required to be unique between two overload control endpoints and does not need to be monotonically increasing.

[Editor's note: how to handle overflows? With time stamps that would be "trivial" since the sequence number would have a structure and we would also know the "validity window" from the life time of the OC-OLR.]

4.5. OC-Validity-Duration AVP

The Validity-Duration OC-Validity-Duration AVP (AVP code TBD4) is type of Unsigned32 and describes the number of seconds the OC-OLR AVP and its content is valid since the creation reception of the new OC-OLR AVP (as indicated by the minocharge

OC-Sequence-Number AVP). The default value for the OC-Validity-Duration AVP value is 5 (i.e., 5 seconds). When the OC-Validity-Duration AVP is not present in the OC-OLR AVP, the default value applies.

A timeout of the overload report has specific concerns that need to be taken into account by the endpoint acting on the earlier received overload report(s). Section $\frac{4-6}{4.7}$ discusses the impacts of timeout in the scope of the traffic abatement algorithms.

As a general guidance for implementations it is RECOMMENDED never to let any overload report to timeout. Rather, Following to this rule, an overload endpoint should explicitly signal, e.g. signal the end of overload condition. condition and not rely on the expiration of the validity time of the overload report in the reacting node. This leaves no need for the other overload endpoint reacting node to reason or guess the overload condition of the other endpoint is at.

4.5. ReportType reporting node.

4.6. OC-Report-Type AVP

The ReportType OC-Report-Type AVP (AVP code TBD5) is type of Enumerated. The value of the AVP describes what the overload report concerns. The following values are initially defined:

0 Reserved.

1 Destination-Host A host report. The overload treatment should apply to requests that the sender reacting node knows will reach the overloaded server, node. For example, requests with a Destination-Host AVP indicating the server, endpoint. The reacting node learns the "host" implicitly from the Origin-Host AVP of the received message that contained the OC-OLR AVP.

2 Realm (aggregated) A realm report. The overload treatment should apply to all requests bound for the overloaded realm. The reacting node learns the "realm" implicitly from the Origin-Realm AVP of the received message that contained the OC-OLR AVP.

```
The default value of the OC-Report-Type AVP is 1 (i.e. the host report).
```

The ReportType AVP is envisioned to be useful for situations where a
reacting node needs to apply different overload treatments for
different "types" of overload. For example, the reacting node(s)
might need to throttle differently requests that are targeted sent to a specific server
(identified by the presence of a Destination-Host AVP than for in the request) and requests
that can be handled by any server in a realm. The example in
Appendix C.3 B.1 illustrates this usage.

(OpenIssue: There is an ongoing discussion about whether the ReportType AVF is the right way to solve that issue, and whether it': needed at all.;

4.6. Reduction-Percentage

4.7. OC-Reduction-Percentage AVP

The Reduction-Percentage OC-Reduction-Percentage AVP (AVP code TBD8) is type of Unsigned32 and describes the percentage of the traffic that the sender is requested to reduce, compared to what it otherwise would have sent. The OC-Reduction-Percentage AVP applies to the default (loss like) algorithm specified in this specification. However, the AVP can be reused for future abatement algorithms, if its semantics fit into the new algorithm.

The value of the Reduction-Percentage AVP is between zero (0) and one hundred (100). Values greater than 100 are interpreted as 100. The value of 100 means that no traffic is expected, i.e. the sender of the information reporting

node is under a severe load and ceases to process any new messages. The value of 0 means that the sender of the information reporting node is in a stable state and has no requests to the other endpoint to apply any traffic abatement.

[Open Issue: We should consider an algorithm independent way to end an overload condition. Perhaps setting the validitytime to zero? Counter comment; since The default value of the abatement OC-Reduction-Percentage AVP is based on a specific

algorithm, it 0. When the OC-Reduction-Percentage AVP is natural to indicate that from not present in the abatement algorithm point of view status quo has been reached.] overload report, the default value applies.

If an overload control endpoint comes out of the 100 percent traffic reduction as a result of the overload report timing out, the following concerns are RECOMMENDED to be applied. The <u>endpoint</u> reacting node sending the traffic should be conservative and, for example, first send few "probe" messages to learn the overload condition of the <u>other endpoint</u> overloaded node before converging to any traffic amount/rate decided by the sender. Similar concerns actually apply in all cases when the

overloaded node before converging to any traffic amount/rate decided by the sender. Similar concerns actually apply in all cases when the overload report times out unless the previous overload report stated 0 percent reduction.

[Open Issue: It is still open whether we need an AVP to indicate the exact used traffic abatement algorithm. Currently it assumed that the reacting node is able to figure out what to do based on the <u>Reducttion-Percentage AVP and possible other embedded information</u> inside the OC-OLR AVP.]

4.7.

4.8. Attribute Value Pair flag rules

| AVP Section MUST Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type MUST NOT + | | | | | + | з
+ | + | | |
|--|-------------------|------|-----|------------------------|-----------|---------|-------|---|--|
| OC-OLR TBD2 x.x Grouped V TimeStamp OC-Sequence-Number TBD3 x.x Time Unsigned64 V ValidityPeriod OC-Validity-Period TBD4 x.x Unsigned32 V OC-ReportType TBD5 x.x Enumerated V ReportType OC-Report-Type TBD5 x.x Enumerated V Reduction V OC-Reduction V | Attribute Name | | | Value Type |
 MUST | MUST | | | |
| TimeStamp OC-Sequence-Number TBD3 x.x Time Unsigned64 ValidityPeriod OC-Validity-Period TBD4 x.x NeportType OC-Report-Type TBD5 x.x Enumerated V Reduction OC-Reduction | OC-Feature-Vector | TBD1 | x.x | Unsigned64 | Groupe | ed | | V | |
| OC-Sequence-Number TBD3 x.x Time Unsigned64 V ValidityPeriod OC-Validity-Period TBD4 x.x Unsigned32 V OC-validity-Period TBD5 x.x Enumerated V ReportType TBD5 x.x Enumerated V OC-Report-Type TBD5 x.x Unsigned32 V Percentage TBD8 x.x Unsigned32 V | OC-OLR | TBD2 | x.x | Grouped | | V | | | |
| OC-Validity-Period TBD4 x.x Unsigned32 V ReportType 00-Report-Type TBD5 x.x Enumerated V Reduction + + + OC-Reduction Percentage TBD8 x.x Unsigned32 V | • | TBD3 | x.x | Time Unsign | ed64 | + | V | I | |
| OC-Report-Type TBD5 x.x Enumerated V Reduction + + OC-Reduction Percentage TBD8 x.x Unsigned32 V | | TBD4 | x.x | Unsigned32 |
+ | v |
+ | | |
| OC-Reduction
-Percentage TBD8 x.x Unsigned32 V | | TBD5 | x.x | Enumerated | | V | | | |
| OC-Features TBD6 x.x Unsigned64 V | OC-Reduction | TBD8 | x.x | Unsigned32 | |
 v | | | |
| | OC-Features | TBD6 | x.x | Unsigned64 | + | v | | | |

As described in the Diameter base protocol [RFC6733], the M-bit setting for a given AVP is relevant to an application and each command within that application that includes the AVP.

The Diameter overload control AVPs SHOULD always be sent with the M-bit cleared when used within existing Diameter applications to avoid backward compatibility issues. Otherwise, when reused in newly defined Diameter applications, the DOC related AVPs SHOULD have the M-bit set.

5. Overload Control Operation

5.1. Overload Control Endpoints

The overload control solution can be considered as an overlay on top of an arbitrary Diameter network. The overload control information is exchanged over on a "DOIC association" between two communicatin communication endpoints. The endpoints, namely the "reacting node" and the "reporting node" do not need to be adjacent Diameter peer nodes, nor they need to be the end-to-end Diameter nodes in a typical "clientserver" deployment with multiple intermediate Diameter agent nodes in between. The overload control endpoint are the two Diameter nodes that decide to exchange overload control information between each other. How the endpoints are determined is specific to a deployment, a Diameter node role in that deployment and local configuration.

The following diagrams illustrate the concept of Diameter Overload End-Points and how they differ from the standard [RFC6733] defined client, server and agent Diameter nodes. The following is the key to the elements in the diagrams:

- C Diameter client as defined in [RFC6733].
- S Diameter server as defined in [RFC6733].
- A $% \left({{{\mathbf{D}}_{{\mathbf{D}}}}_{{\mathbf{D}}}} \right)$ Diameter agent, in either a relay or proxy mode, as defined in

[RFC6733].

DEP Diameter Overload End-Point as defined in this document. In the following figures a DEP may terminate two different DOIC associations being a reporter and reactor at the same time.

Diameter Session A Diameter session as defined in [RFC6733].

DOIC Association A DOIC association exists between two Diameter Overload End-Points. One of the end-points is the overload reporter and the other is the overload reactor.

Figure 2 illustrates the most basic configuration where a client is connected directly to a server. In this case, the session and association are both between the client and server.

| ++ | ++ |
|------------|-----------|
| C | S |
| ++ | ++ |
| DEP | DEP |
| +++ | +++ |
| ļ | |
| {Diameter | Session} |
| {DOIC Asso | ociation} |

Figure 2: Basic DOIC deployment

In Figure 3 there is an agent that is not participating directly in the exchange of overload reports. As a result, the DOIC association is still between the client and the server.




Figure 3: DOIC deployment with non participating agent

Figure 4 illustrates the case where the client does not support Diameter overload. In this case, the DOIC association is between the agent and the server. The agent handles the role of the reactor for overload reports generated by the server.




Figure 4: DOIC deployment with non-DOIC client and DOIC enabled agent

In Figure 5 there is a DOIC association between the client and the agent and a second DOIC association between the agent and the server. One use case requiring this configuration is when the agent is serving as a SFE/SFIM SFE for a set of servers.




Figure 5: A deployment where all nodes support DOIC

Figure 6 illustrates a deployment where some clients support Diameter overload control and some do not. In this case the agent must support Diameter overload control for the non supporting client. It might also need to have a DOIC association with the server, as shown here, to handle overload for a server farm and/or for managing Realm overload.

| ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ |
|-----|----|-----|-----|
| C1 | C2 | A | S |
| ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ |
| DEP | | DEP | DEP |




Figure 6: A deployment with DOIC and non-DOIC supporting clients

Figure 7 illustrates a deployment where some agents support Diameter overload control and others do not.




Figure 7: A deployment with DOIC and non-DOIC supporting agents

5.2. Piggybacking Principle

The overload control solution defined AVPs are essentially piggybacked on top of existing application message exchanges. This is made possible by adding overload control top level AVPs, the OC-OLR AVP and the OC-Feature-Vector AVP into existing commands (this has an assumption that the application CCF allows adding new AVPs into the Diameter messages.

In a case of newly defined Diameter applications, it is RECOMMENDED to add and defined how overload control mechanisms works on that application. using OC-Feature-Vector and OC-OLR AVPs in a non-mandatory manner is intended only existing applications.

Note that the overload control solution does not have fixed server and client roles. The endpoint role is determined based on the sent message type: whether the message is a request (i.e. sent by a "reacting node") or an answer (i.e. send by a "reporting node"). Therefore, in a typical "client-server" deployment, the "client" MAY report its overload condition to the "server" for any server initiated message exchange. An example of such is the server requesting a re-authentication from a client.

5.3. Capability Announcement

Since the overload control solution relies on the piggybacking principle for the overload reporting and the overload control endpoint are likely not adjacent peers, finding out whether the other endpoint supports the overload control or what is the common traffic abatement algorithm to apply for the traffic. The approach defined in this specification for the end-to-end capability capability announcement relies on the exchange of the OC-Feature-Vector between the endpoints. The feature announcement solution also works when carried out on existing applications. For the newly defined application the negotiation can be more exact based on the application specification. The announced set of capabilities MUST NOT change during the life time of the Diameter session (or transaction in a case of non-session maintaining applications).

5.3.1. Request Message Initiator Endpoint Considerations

The basic principle is that the request message initiating endpoint (i.e. the "reacting node") announces its support for the overload control mechanism by including in the request message the OC-Feature-Vector AVP with those capability flag bits that capabilities it supports and is willing to use for this Diameter session (or transaction in a case of a non-session state maintaining applications). In a case of applications the e applications, see Section 3.1.2 for the lifetime of the more details on Diameter session. In a case of nonit sessions). It is RECOMMENDED that the request message initiating endpoint includes the capability announcement into every request regardless it has had prior message exchanges with the give remote endpoint. claration. It's probably not Once the gam an for a had proposals endpoint that initiated the feat every request an OC thic plex for lifotime

support.]

Once the endpoint that initiated the request message receives an answer message from the remote endpoint, it can detect from the received answer message whether the remote endpoint supports the overload control solution and in a case it does, what features are supported. The support for the overload control solution is based on the presence of the OC-Feature-Vector AVP in the Diameter answer for existing application. For the newly defined applications the support for the overload control MAY already be part of the application specification. Based on capability knowledge the request message initiating endpoint can select the preferred common traffic abatement algorithm and act accordingly for the subsequent message exchanges.

5.3.2. Answer Message Initiating Endpoint Considerations

When a remote endpoint (i.e. a "reporting node") receives a request message in can detect whether the request message initiating endpoint has support for the overload control solution based on the presence of the OC-Feature-Vector AVP. For the newly defined applications the overload control solution support can be part of the application specification. Based on the content of the OC-Feature-Vector AVP the request message receiving endpoint knows what overload control functionality the other endpoint supports and then act accordingly for the subsequent answer message that the The answer message

initiating endpoint delects one common traffic abatement algorithm even if MAY announce as many supported capabilities as it would support mult has (the announced set is a subject to local policy and configuration). However, at least one of the announced capabilities MUST be the same as received in the request message.

The answer message initiating endpoint MUST NOT include any overload control solution defined AVPs into its answer messages if the request message initiating endpoint has not indicated support at the beginning of the the created session (or transaction in a case of non-session state maintaining applications). The same also applies if none of the announced capabilities match between the two endpoints.

5.4. Protocol Extensibility

The overload control solution can be extended, e.g. with new traffic abatement algorithms or new functionality. The new features and algorithms MUST be registered with the IANA and for the ppossible possible use with the OC-Feature-Vector for announcing the support for the new features (see Section 7 for the required procedures).

It should be noted that [RFC6733] defined Grouped AVP extension mechanisms also apply. This allows, for example, defining a new feature that is mandatory to understand even when piggybacked on an existing applications. More specifically, the sub-AVPs inside the OC-OLR AVP MAY have the M-bit set. However, when overload control AVPs are piggybacked on top of an existing applications, setting M-bit in sub-AVPs is NOT RECOMMENDED.

5.5. Overload Report Processing

5.5.1. Sender Endpoint Considerations

5.5.2. Receiver Endpoint Considerations

Both reacting and reporting nodes MUST maintain an overload condition

- state for each endpoint (a host or a server can refrain sending <u>OLR in answers based on some magical algorithm? (Note: We seem to</u> realm) they communicate with and both endpoints have consensus that a server MAY repeat OLRs in subsequent messages,
- but announced support for DOIC. See Sections 4.1 and
- 5.3 for discussion how the support for DOIC is not required to do so, based on local policy.);

6. Transport Considerations

In order to reduce determined. The

overload control introduced additional AVP and

- message processing it might condition state SHOULD be desirable/beneficial able to signal whether
 the Diameter command carries overload control information make a difference between
 a realm and a specific host in that should
- be of interest of an realm.

The overload aware Diameter node

- indication should be. Obvious condidates include transport la
- protocols (e.g., SCTP PPID or TCP flags) least the following
- information (per host or Diameter command

7. IANA realm):

- The endpoint information (realm and/or DiameterIdentity, application identifier, etc)
- o Reduction percentage
- o Validity period timer
- o Sequence number
- o Supported/selected traffic abatement algorithm

5.5.2. Reacting Node Considerations

7.1. AVP cod

ew AVPs defined by this specification are listed in Section 4. All

- Once a reacting node receives an OC-OLR AVP codes allocated from a reporting node, it applies the 'Authentication, Authorization, and (AAA) Parameters' AVP Codes registry.
- 2. New registries
- Three new registries ar needed under traffic abatement based on the 'Authentication,
- ization, commonly supported algorithm with the reporting node and Accounting (AAA) Parameters'
- including the initial assignments New values can be added into current overload condition. The reacting node learns the
- ng reporting node supported abatement algorithms directly from the Specification Required policy [RFC5226].
- registry received answer message containing the OC-Feature-Vector AVP or indirectly remembering the previously used traffic abatement algorithm with its
- nn 1 ded using the Spe
- red policy [RFC5226].

Security Considerations

chanism gives Diameter nodes given reporting node.

- The received OC-Feature-Vector AVP does not change the ability to
- xchanging existing overload reports condition and/or traffic abatement algorithm settings if the SequenceNumber AVP contains a value that dire
- This exchange is potentially sub and has equal than the potential multiple methods of attack.
- verload reports ain information about previously received/recorded one. If the topology and
- current status of a Diameter network. This information OC-Feature-Vector AVP is potentially sensitive. Network operators may wish to control
- nauthorized parties to
- use received for competitive intelligence or to target attacks.
- to provide
- uthentication, integrity protection,
- the first time for the reporting node or confidentiality.
- cause complica sending adjacent nodes.

1. Potential Threat Mode

Diameter protocol involves transactions in the form of reques

- e clients SequenceNumber value is veen clients and
- less than the previously received/recorded one, then either the
- sequence number is stale (e.g. an intentional or unintentional replay) and
- may SHOULD be peers, that is,they may share silently discarded. A sequence number value
- less than a direct transport (e.g.
- caverse previous one or MAY also indicate an overflow of the
- sequence number. [Editor's note: do we need more
- intermediaries, known as Diameter Agents. Diameter nodes use TLS DTLS, or IPSec to authenticate peers, and to provide confidential:
- and integrity protection of traffic be ers. Nodes can make
- decisions based say here on the peer identities overflow?]

The OC-OLR AVP contains the transport layer.

- effectively hop-by--hop
- لمل That is, a Diameter client or server agent necessary information of the overload
- condition on the reporting node. Similarly to make
- irs at the integrity nts can read, OC-Feature-Vector's sequence numbering, the OC-OLD AVP also has the SequenceNumber AVP and perhaps modify, any part
- essage, including an overload report.
- t its handling is similar to exploit the one in the OC-
- Feature-Vector AVP. The reacting node MUST update its overload control-
- condition state whenever receiving the net If this third party is upstro
- of an agent, and that agent fails to apply proper authorization policies, downstream nodes may mistakenly trust OC-OLR AVP for the report. This attack is at least partially mitigated by first time

- or the assumption that nodes
- -overload reports in Diameter answers but not SequenceNumber sub-AVP indicates a change in requests. quires an attacker to have knowledge the OC-OLR AVP. lude This required

Each OC-OLR AVP also contains the validity duration of the original reque

entations SHOULD containing overload an answei information either explicitly or implicitly. The reacting node MUST maintain an overload report is a properly constructed response to a pending request prior to acting on condi-(or realm) it communicates with. Once the validity duration times ting on condition validity timer for each reporting node out, the reacting node MUST assume the overload report. Diameter condition has ended with the given reporting node that sends and discard all overload condition state information with the reporting node. The ValidityDuration AVP with value 0 indicates an inappropriate explicit expiration of the overload report. For example, a condition state for a giver "ReportType" (see next paragraph). From the ReportType AVP the reacting node learns whether the rea send an overload condition report concerns a e on specific host (as identified by the rep within that Origin-Host AVP of the report answer message containing the OC-OLR AVP) or for the report to of her: applies to a entire realm not andled (as identified by that might use the information in an could Origin-Realm AVP of the answer ++acker message containing the OC-OLR AVP). The reacting node SHOULD use this information 🛥 as 🖶 learn an input for its traffic abatement algorithm. The idea is that the results reacting node apply different handling of the traffic abatement, whether sent request messages are targeted to a p specific host or ongoin eter overload reports can cause a node to cease tended period. 11 Diamotor Thic tempting vector for DoS tacks. Furthermore, since Diameter is al always used any host in support of other protocols, a Dos nodes realm. In the context of this specification and the default traffic abatement algorithm, the Reduction-Percentage AVP value MUST NOT honor or forward be interpreted in the following way: value == 0 Indicates explicitly the end of overload reports from unauthorized or Non-Compliant Node n a Diameter condition and the reacting node sends an should not apply the traffic abatement algorithm procedures any more for the given reporting node (or realm). The reacting node MAY still preserve the overload rep rt. it cannot assume condition state information with the given reacting node (or realm). value == 100 Indicates that A non compliant the reporting node might continue (or realm) does not want to cend nodes will comply indicates that receive any traffic from the over that reacting node for the application the assum report concerns. The reacting node MUST do all Di wily des measure not be allowed to take send traffic to the reporting node (or realm) as long as the overload con mechanism condition changes or expires. 0 < value < 100 Indicates that the reporting node urges the reacting node to get more reduce its traffic by a given percentage. For example if the abs reacting node has been sending 100 packets per second to the reporting node, then a reception of an overload control mecha Diameter nodes need Reduction-Percentage value of 10 would mean that from now on the reacting node MUST only send 90 packets per second. How the reacting node achieves the "true reduction" transactions leading to implement strategies the sent request messages is up to protect themselves the implementation. The reacting node MAY simply drop every 10th packet from floods of needed to be a series of the seneric application logic try to make sure recover from it. 5.5.3. Reporting Node Considerations

[OpenIssue: did we now agree that e.g. a disproportionate

- From receiving service. For not pre sourc
- example, a Diameter server might reject a certain percentage of
- ontrol can be thought of as an optimization for such strategies, where soure exceed certain limits. eau the excess requests refrain sending
- **OLR** in the first place.
- the presence of an overload control mechani: . ed for these other protection strategies.

End-to End-Security Issues

The lack of end-to-end security features makes it far more difficult answers based on some magical algorithm? (Note: We seem to establish adiacent nodes. Any agents in the message path may insert or modify es must trust

- have consensus that their adjacent
- reating a transitive trust extending for potentially requirement
- of nodes. Netwo transitive trust requirement server MAY repeat OLRs in subsequent messages, but is acceptable for their deployments.

- ability not required to select which are trusted do so, based on local policy.)]

6. Transport Considerations

- In order to deliver reduce overload - control introduced additional AVP and wheth message processing it might be desirable/beneficial to forward signal whether the Diameter command carries overload report ts
- nIssue: This requires control information that a responding node should be able to tell a
- erated OLR fro
- way of doing this would interest of an overload aware Diameter node.
- Should such indication be to include the identity is not part of the
- [OpenIssue: Do we need further langua equiver about this specification. It has not either been concluded at what rules an agent layer such possible indication should apply before forwarding an OLB21
- The lack of end to end protect: emente be. Obvious candidates include transport layer protocols (e.g., SCTP PPID or TCP flags) or Diameter command header flags.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. AVP codes

New AVPs defined by this specification are listed in Section 4. All AVP codes allocated from the overload control requirements docu [I-D.ietf-dime-overload-reqs] Requirement 34 requires the ability send overload reports across intermediaries (i.e. agents) that

- Requirement 27 forbids 'Authentication, Authorization, and
- Accounting (AAA) Parameters' AVP Codes registry.
- 7.2. New registries

Three new registries are needed under the mechanism from adding 'Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Parameters' registry.

Section 4.2 defines a new wulnerabilities or ingreasing "Overload Control Feature Vector" registry including the

- isting ones. A non supporting agent will
- severity of existing ones. In how supporting as likely forward overload reports without inspecting them or likely forward overload reports without inspecting them or likely forward overload reports without inspecting them or transitive trust issue considerably more of
- registry using the Specification Required policy [RFC5226]. See Section 4.2 for the initial assignment in the registry.

Section 4.6 defines a problem. Without new "Overload Report Type" rinitial assignments. New types can be added using the Specification Without new "Overload Report Type" registry with its Required policy [RFC5226].

8. Security Considerations

This mechanism gives Diameter nodes the ability to authority and integrity protect request that downstream nodes send fewer Diameter requests. Nodes do this by exchanging overload reports ing agent, that directly affect this reduction. This exchange is potentially subject to multiple methods of attack, and has the mechanism mply wi requirements.

{OpenIssue: What we want potential to do about this? Req27 is be used as a mative MUST, while Req34 is "merely" Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack vector.

Overload reports may contain information about the topology and current status of a SHOULD. Diameter network. This would a 27 has information is

potentially sensitive. Network operators may wish to take e say that control disclosure of overload reports MUST NOT be sent to and/or accepted from non-supporting

-can unauthorized parties to avoid its use for competitive intelligence or to target attacks. Diameter does not include features to provide end-to-end security?] authentication, integrity protection, or confidentiality. This may cause complications when sending overload reports between nonadjacent nodes. 8.1. Potential Threat Modes end confidentiality protection means that any Diameter agent protocol involves transactions in the path of an overload The lock contents form of that report. In addition to the requirement gend or rators MUST requests which pe rerload reports. c and answers exchanged between clients and servers. These clients and servers may be authorized to receive able any overload reports peers, that forwarding is, they may share a direct transport (e.g. TCP or SCTP) connection, or the messages may traverse one or more intermediaries, known as Diameter message Agents. Diameter nodes use TLS, DTLS, or IPSec to a p rized authenticate peers, and to rea e provide confidentiality and integrity protection of this writing, traffic between peers. Nodes can make authorization decisions based on the DIME working group is studying nts peer identities authenticated at the transport layer. When agents are involved, this presents an effectively hop-by-hop trust model. That is, a Diameter client or server can authorize an agent for adding end-to-end security [I-D.ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req] featur es certain actions, but it must trust that agent to Diameter. then they become available, might make i appropriate authorization decisions about its peers, and so on. Since confidentiality and integrity protection occurs at the transport layer. Agents can read, and perhaps modify, any part of a Diameter message, including an overload report. There are several ways an attacker might attempt to establish ent nodes for exploit the overload control purposes. reminded, however, mechanism. An unauthorized third party might inject an overload report into the network. If this third party is upstream of an agent, and that agent fails to apply proper authorization policies, downstream nodes may mistakenly trust the report. This attack is at least partially mitigated by the assumption that nodes include overload control <u>mechanism encourages</u> reports in Diameter agents answers but not in requests. This requires an attacker to modify AVPs in, ditional AVPs into, existing messages have knowledge of the original request in order to construct a response. Therefore, implementations SHOULD validate that are originated by nodes. If end-to-end security is enabled, there an answer containing an overload report is a risk properly constructed response to a pending request prior to acting on the overload report. A similar attack involves an otherwise authorized Diameter node that such modification using any future Diam end-to-end security mechanism wi+h sends an inappropriate overload control will beyond report. For example, a server for the scope of Contribut The feller ion realm "example.com" might send an overload report indicating that a competitor's realm "example.net" is overloaded. If other nodes act on the report, they may falsely believe that "example.net" is overloaded, effectively reducing that realm's capacity. Therefore, it's critical that nodes validate that an overload report received from a peer actually falls within that peer's responsibility before acting on the report or forwarding the report to this document: Eric McMurry s Ts Ulrich Wiehe Jean-Jacques Tro el Mor ria Cruz Bartol Martin Dolly Nirav Salot Susan Shishufeng Acknowledgement:

....

11. References

1.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for other peers. For example, an overload report from an peer that applies to a realm not handled by that peer is suspect.
- An attacker might use the information in RFCs to Indicate 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - BCI
- Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008.
- [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.

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[I-D.ietf-dime-overload-reqs]

- rry, E. and ell. "Di Requir ", draft-ietf-di overload-reqs-13 (work er 2013. ess), Ser
- [RFC4006] Hakala, H., Mattila, L., Stura, M. Skinen, J-P., Stura, M., and Control Application", RFC 400 meter Credit Loughney,
- for future specifications
- The base solution for the overload control does not cover all possible certain attacks. For example, an attacker could use cases. A number of solution aspects were intentionally oft for futu

. Additional traffic abatement algorithms

- This specification describes only means for a simple loss based
- algorithm. Future algorithms can be added using the d algorithms need information
- about current overload conditions to be
- red with IANA. See Sections 4.1 and 7 time a DoS attack for the required IANA regis steps.

.2. Agent Overload

- s specification focuses on Diameter end-point (server maximum
- effect, or client)
- separate extension will be required use subsequent overload reports as a feedback mechanism to outline the overload. hondling
- learn the case results of agent overload.
- A.3. DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY clarifications
- current [RFC6733] behaviour in a case previous or ongoing attack.

8.2. Denial of DIAMETER TOO BUSY is

- le, there is no information long the specific Service Attacks
- Diameter overload reports can cause a node is willing to be wailable.
- ing [RFC6733] should clarify the upda
- BUSY from the error answer initiating cease sending some or
- all Diameter node
- ing requests for an extended period. This makes them a tempting vector for DoS tacks. Furthermore, since Diameter node point is almost
- always used in support of view. Further, the inclusion of
- should be discussed and possible be pro
- nded be used.

- Conformance to Requireme

- analyses, which other protocols, a DoS attack on Diameter Overload Co iollowing se tion ments [I-D.ietf-dime-overload-r eqs] medification.
- S Supported
- P Partial
- N Not supported
- qmt | S/ | Notes

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b. Non-Compliant Mode
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</pre> | ander NUT HOT Noor or forward overlad reports from unauthorized or
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solution overload control mechanism does not depend on how
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haven't missed anything.
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5 end-points are discovered. Comment: it might be
worth working through at least one use case showing
bNO based dynamic period dynamic period by the second on how
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NEQ P Need to update text as some configuration is required.
6 Need need for these other protection strategies.
1. End-to End-Security Issues
The lack of end-to-end security features makes it far more difficult
to determine if establish trust in overload reports that originate from non-
adjacent nodes. Any gents in the everent discussion message path may insert or modify
overload reports. Nodes must trust that their adjacent peers perform
proper checks on +
Need need to update the text as algorithm, which +
7 he DOIC solution supports the loss algorithm, which
1 no overload epplication id increases the amount of
1 no overload control MUST give operators the
1 no overload control MUST give operators the
2 able on their peers and so on,
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1 ong chains of nodes. Network operators must determine if this requirement. There
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1 dedress oscillations.
Nodes supporting Diameter overload control MUST give operators the
ability to address oscillations.
Nodes supporting Diameter overload control MUST give operators the
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1 dedress detribe after an deliver overload report expires
1 reports, and whether they are trusted to +
1 dedress this concern. Suggested different wording:
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Diameter ag</pre> | downstream | nodes never send everleed while addresses Bierster |
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remove the +
5 end-points are discovered. Comment: it might be
worth working through at least one use case showing
bNO based dynamic period dynamic period by the second on how
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NEQ P Need to update text as some configuration is required.
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| values to converge path of an overload report can view the | | | |

| content | s of that report. In addition to the optimal traffic or requirement to + |
|---------------------|--|
| a alta da ante a se | smoothly come back select |
| which p | eers are trusted to normal traffic conditions when
send overload decreases and ends. |
| | |
| able to | The DOIC solution supports a timestamp reports, operators MUST be
select which is meant |
| | peers are authorized to serve as a receive reports. A node |
| MUST no | t send an overload report version indication to address |
| | this requirement. Comment: The use of the timestamp |
| | is under discussion. |
| REO | The DOIC solution uses a piggybacking strategy for |
| | carrying overload reports, which scales lineraly with |
| | the amount of traffic. As such, the first part of |
| | the requirement is addressed. The DOIC solution does |
| | peer not support a mechanism for sending authorized to receive |
| it. Fu | rthermore, an agent MUST remove any overload reports 🕂 |
| | over that |
| might h | ave been inserted by other nodes before forwarding a quiescent transport connections or, more |
| | |
| message | to a peer that are is not producing |
| | traffic. Suggested different wording: The DOIC |
| | solution uses a piggybacking strategy for carrying and a s |
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| At the | first part time of this writing, the + |
| | requirement DIME working group is addressed. For a connection that has Image: Connection that Image: Conneconnection that Image: Connection t |
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| require | ments for adding end-to-end security |
| [I-D.ie | tf-dime-e2e-sec-req] features to Diameter. These features, |
| when th | ey become quiescent due available, might make it easier to OLRs with a 100% traffic |
| | reduction, establish trust |
| | adjacent nodes for overload control purposes. Readers should |
| | nded, however, that the validity timer allows overload control mechanism encourages |
| | r agents to handle this |
| | case. Other cases of quiescent connections modify AVPs in, or insert additional AVPs into, |
| | g messages that are + |
| | outside the scope originated by other nodes. If end-to-end
y is enabled, there is a risk that such modification could |
| | integrity protection. The details of using any future |
| | r end-to-end security mechanism with overload (e-g, their |
| | handling may be done through control will |
| | careful consideration, and are beyond the watch dog scope of the |
| | Diameter base protocol) |
| | |
| REQ | S this |
| documen | t. |
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| 9. Contri | butors |
| _, _, | |
| | C solution supports two methods following people contributed substantial ideas, feedback, and |
| discuss | ion to this document: |
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o Susan Shishufeng

10. References

10.1. Normative References

| 10 | the length of an overload condition. First, all |
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| | after which the node reacting use in RFCs to the report can |
| | the solution supports the method Indicate |
| | Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. |
| | |
| FC5226] | Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for the node |
| FC5226] | Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for the mode |
| FC5226] | |
| FC5226] | <pre></pre> |
| FC5226] | originating the overload report to explicitly communicate that the condition has ended. This latter mechanism depends on traffic to be sent from |
| xFC5226] | originating the overload report to explicitly communicate that the condition has ended. This latter mechanism depends on traffic to be sent from the reacting node and, as such, can not be depended |
| 2FC5226] | originating the overload report to explicitly communicate that the condition has ended. This latter mechanism depends on traffic to be sent from |
| REQ | originating the overload report to explicitly |

[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and for network configurations with a | | | single Diameter agent hop. More analysis is required |

| 3GPP.23 | | | |
|--|------|---|---|
| 3GPP.23 | rmat | ive References | |
| | .203 |] | |
| | | GPP, "Policy and charging control architecture", 3GPP
S 23.203 10.9.0, September 2013. | |
| | т | S 23.203 10.9.0, September 2013. | |
| 3GPP.29 | | - | |
| | 3 | GPP, "Cx and Dx interfaces based on the DOIC solution har
 large Diameter network with partitioned or segmented | dies very |
| | | server farms requiring multiple hops through Diameter | |
| | | agents. | |
| REO | р | -
The DOIC solution focuses | |
| illig | p | rotocol; Protocol details", 3GPP TS 29.229 10.5.0, | |
| | м | arch 2013. | |
| 3GPP.29 | .272 | 1 | |
| | | GPP, "Evolved Packet System (EPS); Mobility Management | |
| | | ntity (MME) and Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) related
nterfaces based on Diameter end point | |
| 12 | | overload protocol", 3GPP TS 29.272 | |
| | 1 | 0.8.0, June 2013. | |
| I-D.iet | f-di | me-e2e-sec-reg] | |
| | | schofenig, H., Korhonen, J., Zorn, G., and meets this req | uirement for those |
| | | Diameter nodes. The DOIC solution does not address | |
| | | Here and the provided the provided and the provided an | this + |
| + | | requirement for those Diameter nodes. | |
| REO | 2 | -
The DOIC solution requires including of the overload | |
| 13 | | report in all answer messages in some situations. It | |
| | | is not agreed, however, that this constitutes | |
| | | substantial work. This can also be mitigated by the
sender of the overload report keeping state to record | |
| | | who has received overload reports. It is left to | |
| | | implementation decisions as to which approach is | |
| | | taken send in all messages or send once with a record of who has received the report. Another way | |
| | | is to let the request sender (reacting node) insert | |
| | | information in the request to say whether a | |
| | | throttling is actually performed. The reporting node then can base its decision on information received in | |
| | | the request; no need for keeping state to record who | |
| | | has received overload reports. The DOIC solution | |
| | d | <pre>+ also requires capabilities negotiation Requirements",
raft-ietf-dime-e2e-sec-req-00 (work in every</pre> | |
| | | request progress), | |
| | S | | |
| | | eptember 2013. | |
| RFC4006 | | akala, H., Mattila, L., Koskinen, J-P., Stura, M., and re | sponse message, which increa |
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particular throttling of the request

coming f:

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| REQ | + ? - | It isn't clear yet that if this requirement is |
| 18 | - | addressed. There has been a proposal to mark |
| | - | messages that survived overload throttling as one |
| | - | + method for an overloaded node to address fairness bu |
| | - | + this proposal is not yet part of the solution. It is |
| | - | also possible that the overloaded node could use |
| | - | state gathered as part of the capability |
| | - | advertisement mechanism to know if the sending node |
| | | supports the DOIC solution and if not, to apply a |
| | | particular throttling of the requests coming from |
| | | these non supporting DOIC clients. |
| REQ | C | -
The DOIC solution supports the ability for the |
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19 | 5 | overloaded node and the reacting node to be in |
| 1, | | different administrative domains. |
| | | |
| REQ | | This mechanism is still under discussion. Comment 1 |
| 20 | i | I think this is a "S". OLRs are clearly |
| | - | distinguishable from any error code. The fact that |
| | - | an agent would need to send errors if it throttles i |
| | - | not an overload indication per se. It needs to do |
| | - | that even without DoC. OTOH, if we apply some DOC |
| | - | related fix to TOO BUSY, we probably need a new code |
| | - | Comment 2: New AVPs conveys overload control |
| | - | information, and this is transported on existing |
| | - | answer messages, so distinguishable from Diameter |
| | - | errors. |
| | | |
| REQ | 6 | The inability for a node to send overload reports |
| 21 | | will result in equivalent through put to a network |
| | | that does not support the DOIC solution. |
| REQ | 5 | The DOIC solution gives this node generating the |
| -22 | - | overload report the ability to control the amount of |
| | | throttling done by the reacting node using the |
| | | reduction percentage parameter in the overload |
| | | report. |
| | - | - |
| REQ | + ? | Initial text: The DOIC mechanism supports two |
| 23 | | abatement strategies by reacting nodes, routing to a |
| | - | alternative node or dropping traffic. The routing t |
| | - | an alternative node will be enhanced when the Load |
| | | extension is defined. Comment: This is a N. There's
no good way to determine which nodes are likely to |
| | - | |
| | | have sufficient capacity without some sort of load |
| | | metric for non-overloaded nodes. |
| | | |
| REQ | N | The DOIC solution does not address delivering load |
| 24 | | information. |
| REO | G | -
The DOIC solution contains some guideance. |
| | | The Bore Boracion concurns some gardeance. |
| -25 | | |

Loughney, "Diameter Credit-Control Application", RFC 4006, August 2005.

[RFC7068] McMurry, E. and B. Campbell, "Diameter Overload Control Requirements", RFC 7068, November 2013.

Appendix A. Issues left for future specifications

-ability | The **DOIC** base solution for the overload control does not constrain + to determine which requests are trottled. -26

REQ ? Initial text: The DOIC cover all possible use cases. A number of solution deep add aspects were intentionally left for future specification and protocol work.

A.1. Additional traffic abatement algorithms

This specification describes only means for a simple loss based algorithm. Future algorithms can be added using the designed solution extension mechanism. The new line algorithms need to be registered with IANA. See Sections 4.1 and 7 for the required IANA steps. A.2. Agent Overload

This specification focuses on Diameter end-point (server or client) overload. A separate extension will be required to outline the handling the case of attack agent overload.

A.3. DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY clarifications

an attacker that would assert erroneous error somewhat under specified. For example, there is + urity sol currently being worked on by no information how long the DIME working group

ulurabilities. be unavailable. A specification updating [RFC6733] should clarify the handling of ill hov nsiderably a ersonally, I -requiring e2e security. We probably DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY from the error answer initiating Diameter node point of view and from the security implications original request initiating Diameter node point of view. Further, the + inclusion of possible additional verbage: An OLR only relat information providing AVPs should be discussed and possible be recommended to be used. Appendix B. Examples B.1. Mix of Destination-Realm routed requests and Destination-Host routed requests Diameter allows a client to optionally select the traffic between destination server g node request, even if there are agents between the client and the een destination server of a rep The client does this using the Destination-Host AVP. In server. cases where the client does not care if a re and specific server receives the request, it can omit Destination-Host and route the request using the Destination-Realm and Application Id, effectively block letting an agent select the traf m server. Clients commonly send mixtures of Destination-Host and Destination-Realm routed requests. For example, in an application that uses user sessions, a client + typically won't care which w significan There server handles session-initiating requests. But once the session is initiated, the end client will send all subsequent requests in that session to the OLR same server. Therefore it would send the initial request with no Destination-Host AVP. If it receives a successful answer, the client would copy the Origin-Host value of 100% reduction which has from the answer message into a higher vul Destination-Host AVP in each subsequent request in the use of which buld be avoided v molicious OLDs must be session. An agent has very limited options in answers, which means applyin requests that contain Destination-Host AVPs. It typically cannot e applying overload abatement to route the + apability request to insert a different server than the malicious OLR one identified in an existing | Destination-Host. It's only remaining options are to throttle such requests locally, or to create send an answer which overload report back towards the client so the client can throttle the requests. The second choice is much usually more efficient, since it prevents any throttled requests from being sent in the first place, and removes the agent's need to create a send errors back to the client for each dropped request. To have On the other hand, an agent has much more leeway to gen rds apply overload ager abatement for requests that do not contain Destination-Host AVPs. If the agent has multiple servers in its peer table for the given realm and application, it can route such requests to other, less overloaded servers. If the overload severity increases, the agent may reach a point where there is not sufficient capacity across all re It servers to handle even realm-routed requests. In this case, the realm itself can be considered that overloaded. The agent may need the baseline L offer releve l of s uld client to throttle realm-routed requests in addition to Destination-Host routed requests. The overload severity may be beneficial REQ 18 different for each server, and REO 27. Suggested add may the severity for the realm at is likely to be provided different than for detection Guidance mpliant/a any specific server. Therefore, an agent may need to forward, or originate, multiple overload reports with differing ReportType and Reduction-Percentage values. Figure 8 illustrates such a mixed-routing scenario. In this example, the servers S1, S2, and S3 handle requests for the realm "realm". Any of OLRS, not only by endpoints | diate alco by into DA that the three can be aware handle requests that are not part of + edqe analysis with a security exp

session (i.e. routed by Destination-Realm). But once a session is established, all requests in that session must go to the same server.



Figure 8: Mix of Destination-Host and Destination-Realm Routed Requests

- The client sends a request with no Destination-Host AVP (that is, a Destination-Realm routed request.)
- The agent follows local policy to select a server from its peer table. In this case, the agent selects S2 and forwards the request.
- S1 is overloaded. It sends a answer indicating success, but also includes an overload report. Since the overload report only applies to S1, the ReportType is "Destination-Host".
- 4. The agent sees the overload report, and records that S1 is overloaded by the value in the Reduction-Percentage AVP. It begins diverting the indicated percentage of realm-routed traffic from S1 to S2 and S3. Since it can't divert Destination-Host routed traffic, it forwards the overload report to the client. This effectively delegates the throttling of traffic with Destination-Host:S1 to the client.
- 5. The client sends another Destination-Realm routed request.
- 6. The agent selects S2, and forwards the request.

| 7. | It turns out that S2 is also overloaded, perhaps due to all that traffic it took over for S1. S2 returns an successful answer |
|-----|---|
| | containing an overload report. Since this report only applies to |
| | S2, the ReportType is possible) or |
| | |
| 1.1 | |
| 8. | The agent sees that S2 is also overloaded by the value in |
| | Reduction-Percentage. This DOIC baseline solution value is + |
| | |
| | a logg algorithm and DOTC should not require further |

| Reductio | n-Fercentage. This DOIC paseline solution value is +
 a loss algorithm and DOIC should not require further
 apecification. probably different than the |
|----------|---|
| | om S1's report. The enswer agent diverts the remaining traffic
indicates S3 as best as it can, but it calculates that the +
possibility remaining |
| | <pre>/ possibility leadership
/ across all three servers is no longer sufficient to add other algorithms on top
 ll of the +
 DOIC baseline solution. The DOIC solution currently </pre> |
| | defines this loss algorithm as realm-routed traffic. This means the default algorithm. |
| itself i | s still under discussion to make it as mandatory |
| | overloaded. The ability to communicate realm's overload reports between
supporting Diameter nodes does not require agents to
support the DOIC solution. Load information exchange |
| | percentage is not currently defined. |

Table 1

Appendix C. Examples

C.1. 3GPP S6a interface overload indication

[TDD: Would cover S6a MME-HSS communication with several topology choices (such as with most

likely different than that for either S1 or without DRA, S2. The agent forward's S2's report back to the client in the Diameter answer. Additionally, the agent generates a new report for the realm of "realm", and inserts that report into the answer. The client throttles requests with <u>"generic" agents</u>).

C.2. 3GPP PCC interfaces overload indication

[TBD: Would cover Cx/Rx and maybe S9...]

C.3. Mix of Destination Realm routed Destination-Host:S1 at one rate, requests with Destination-Host:S2 at another rate, and Destination-Host reouted requests

[TDD: Add example showing the use of with no Destination-Host type OLRs and Realm type OLRs.] AVP at yet a third rate. (Since S3 has not indicated overload, the client does not throttle requests with Destination-Host:S3.)

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