[Dime] unexpected consequence of deprecating E2E security in RFC 3588 bis

[Glen Zorn <[e-mail]>]

Section 4.5 of RFC 3588 says:
    The following table describes the Diameter AVPs defined in the base
    protocol, their AVP Code values, types, possible flag values and
    whether the AVP MAY be encrypted.  For the originator of a Diameter
    message, "Encr" (Encryption) means that if a message containing that
    AVP is to be sent via a  Diameter agent (proxy, redirect or relay)
    then the message MUST NOT be sent unless there is end-to-end security
    between the originator and the recipient and integrity /
    confidentiality protection is offered for this AVP OR the originator
    has locally trusted configuration that indicates that end-to-end
    security is not needed.  Similarly, for the originator of a Diameter
    message, a "P" in the "MAY" column means that if a message containing
    that AVP is to be sent via a  Diameter agent (proxy, redirect or
    relay) then the message MUST NOT be sent unless there is end-to-end
    security between the originator and the recipient or the originator
    has locally trusted configuration that indicates that end-to-end
    security is not needed.

The corresponding section of 3588bis says:
    The following table describes the Diameter AVPs defined in the base
    protocol, their AVP Code values, types, and possible flag values.

Considerable information (and normative guidance) seems to have been 
lost here: in particular, the statements that "the message MUST NOT be 
sent unless... the originator has locally trusted configuration that 
indicates that end-to-end security is not needed" would seem to be valid 
even in the absence of an E2E security solution.