Re: TLS 1.1/1.2 impact on applications protocols

[Brian E Carpenter <[e-mail]>]

On 2007-01-30 22:50, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> The language Scott references ("using the latest version supported by 
> both parties") seems reasonable, but I think what's being asked for is 
> for the latest version to automatically become MTI.

I can imagine that creating considerable confusion for people using
RFCs in procurement requirements and the like. Obviously it's highly
desirable from a security PoV, but if we make RFCs refer to variable
quantities, we create great complications for the consumers of
our work.

     Brian

> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 
> On 2007/01/31, at 4:02 AM, Scott Hollenbeck wrote:
> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Chris Newman [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 11:38 PM
>>> To: Apps Discuss
>>> Cc: Pasi Eronen; Eric Rescorla
>>> Subject: TLS 1.1/1.2 impact on applications protocols
>>>
>>> The changes that are happening in the TLS WG with the
>>> publication of TLS 1.1 and the upcoming TLS 1.2 do have a
>>> significant impact on application deployment.  Many of our
>>> application protocols make TLS 1.0 mandatory-to-implement.
>>> I'd like to see a discussion of the importance of transition
>>> to 1.2 (when it comes out) and the real-world problems that
>>> might occur.  Do we need to update our application protocol
>>> specifications to mandate the newer version?  Or perhaps we
>>> need an app-area RFC which does that to a set of application
>>> protocols?
>>>
>>> Can we just have a blanket exception to the standards status
>>> (proposed/draft/full) reference rules for the TLS base spec
>>> (and trust the TLS WG to do the right thing)?  It seems more
>>> important to keep up-to-date on security technology than to
>>> have normative reference purity.
>>>
>>> Perhaps this would be a good topic for the Prague apparea meeting?
>>
>> I just ran into this very situation in the process of bringing EPP (RFCs
>> 3730 - 3734) to Draft.  The IESG was OK with a normative downward 
>> reference
>> to TLS 1.0 and some additional text to note that the work is still 
>> evolving.
>> Here's what we agreed to say:
>>
>> "When layered over TCP, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 
>> version
>> 1.0 [RFC2246] or its successors (such as TLS 1.1 [RFC4346]), using the
>> latest version supported by both parties, MUST be used to provide 
>> integrity,
>> confidentiality, and mutual strong client-server authentication."
>>
>> The reference to 2246 is normative; a downref note and exception 
>> processing
>> was required.  The reference to 4346 is informative.  This approach 
>> worked
>> because EPP does not depend on any version-specific features of TLS.  The
>> situation may well be different for other protocols.
>>
>> -Scott-
> 
> 
> -- 
> Mark Nottingham     http://www.mnot.net/
>