Re: TLS 1.1/1.2 impact on applications protocols

[Mark Nottingham <[e-mail]>]

The language Scott references ("using the latest version supported by  
both parties") seems reasonable, but I think what's being asked for  
is for the latest version to automatically become MTI.

Cheers,


On 2007/01/31, at 4:02 AM, Scott Hollenbeck wrote:

>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Chris Newman [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Monday, January 29, 2007 11:38 PM
>> To: Apps Discuss
>> Cc: Pasi Eronen; Eric Rescorla
>> Subject: TLS 1.1/1.2 impact on applications protocols
>>
>> The changes that are happening in the TLS WG with the
>> publication of TLS 1.1 and the upcoming TLS 1.2 do have a
>> significant impact on application deployment.  Many of our
>> application protocols make TLS 1.0 mandatory-to-implement.
>> I'd like to see a discussion of the importance of transition
>> to 1.2 (when it comes out) and the real-world problems that
>> might occur.  Do we need to update our application protocol
>> specifications to mandate the newer version?  Or perhaps we
>> need an app-area RFC which does that to a set of application
>> protocols?
>>
>> Can we just have a blanket exception to the standards status
>> (proposed/draft/full) reference rules for the TLS base spec
>> (and trust the TLS WG to do the right thing)?  It seems more
>> important to keep up-to-date on security technology than to
>> have normative reference purity.
>>
>> Perhaps this would be a good topic for the Prague apparea meeting?
>
> I just ran into this very situation in the process of bringing EPP  
> (RFCs
> 3730 - 3734) to Draft.  The IESG was OK with a normative downward  
> reference
> to TLS 1.0 and some additional text to note that the work is still  
> evolving.
> Here's what we agreed to say:
>
> "When layered over TCP, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol  
> version
> 1.0 [RFC2246] or its successors (such as TLS 1.1 [RFC4346]), using the
> latest version supported by both parties, MUST be used to provide  
> integrity,
> confidentiality, and mutual strong client-server authentication."
>
> The reference to 2246 is normative; a downref note and exception  
> processing
> was required.  The reference to 4346 is informative.  This approach  
> worked
> because EPP does not depend on any version-specific features of  
> TLS.  The
> situation may well be different for other protocols.
>
> -Scott-

--
Mark Nottingham     http://www.mnot.net/