Re: [dispatch] Updating DKIM for stronger crypto

"John R Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Wed, 22 March 2017 03:05 UTC

Return-Path: <johnl@taugh.com>
X-Original-To: dispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4120012944C for <dispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 21 Mar 2017 20:05:55 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.001
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1536-bit key) header.d=iecc.com header.b=oBADbr5S; dkim=pass (1536-bit key) header.d=taugh.com header.b=o9RpOscx
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rlrqd_C3_wBV for <dispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 21 Mar 2017 20:05:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from miucha.iecc.com (abusenet-1-pt.tunnel.tserv4.nyc4.ipv6.he.net [IPv6:2001:470:1f06:1126::2]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 810AC131440 for <dispatch@ietf.org>; Tue, 21 Mar 2017 20:05:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (qmail 95520 invoked from network); 22 Mar 2017 03:05:52 -0000
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple; d=iecc.com; h=date:message-id:from:to:cc:subject:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:content-type:user-agent; s=1751e.58d1ea10.k1703; bh=61/HgxzJNKKIXnrjuNuKaNJLeCIMBFddcEXR7N4BCdU=; b=oBADbr5S57Z6F9vyt8VU9yxMARs27LpoaJ2rCix2kDI0e9ZNc4DivygIDJjT8YDaLn3t971lzqxwv3QCQz00yMDEwVhP7laD9hjO6nv0XJnxxgMlXwaSBh2j7+u2s6w8Gu4t+etO4tZIJllTK4c1+mL9XV/8lBOe9dZd8WBtmdmdi9+X9NGh6Cy2mtjApswbpiiDMzvXAxFtGoaFHRJfm23hhJ6OjIPaDXOzIIU/a9A6OI6sH7NxLixED4oWHC52
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple; d=taugh.com; h=date:message-id:from:to:cc:subject:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:content-type:user-agent; s=1751e.58d1ea10.k1703; bh=61/HgxzJNKKIXnrjuNuKaNJLeCIMBFddcEXR7N4BCdU=; b=o9RpOscxo68ksAAS5tMeP6+biEANsu6w9Ds5SOO3nmC92rkjbr4+Mn2tDB2PehsHY1ncXa/BVBllak+/qOd9QDhf9AR58d0BFxocAsYWttl4+58d41lbhQpCb+TMGCJsB4xRy42FFwJjp9gnqHldZMcDNhkymakNGW4Wi5t6aIuzwjA2ejBtVURXx6KikqYzZd3HNcx0Wvcjx9AazH83Dgpj0Viq6l2UwWm3+vPUcbyVWCfa7LPmiOSlL1ZsVc/s
Received: from localhost ([IPv6:2001:470:1f07:1126::78:696d:6170]) by imap.iecc.com ([IPv6:2001:470:1f07:1126::78:696d:6170]) with ESMTPS (TLS1.2/X.509/AEAD) via TCP6; 22 Mar 2017 03:05:52 -0000
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 23:05:51 -0400
Message-ID: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1703212304580.35100@ary.qy>
From: John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: DISPATCH <dispatch@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <CABkgnnXMtSOzxm1YX7f32iFDXq7gEeznt2Gnm1ni8GRYGmR1jA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CABkgnnVB3ztkaN3YuQbaVG4znh_3XNu_SWN+9KNmZ66zVF-R+g@mail.gmail.com> <20170322023133.72699.qmail@ary.lan> <CABkgnnXMtSOzxm1YX7f32iFDXq7gEeznt2Gnm1ni8GRYGmR1jA@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (OSX 67 2015-01-07)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"; format="flowed"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dispatch/216Zz8Y3-RLUhIG7a0c0hbM4QQk>
Subject: Re: [dispatch] Updating DKIM for stronger crypto
X-BeenThere: dispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: DISPATCH Working Group Mail List <dispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dispatch>, <mailto:dispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:dispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch>, <mailto:dispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 03:05:55 -0000

> On 22 March 2017 at 13:31, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
>> We designed DKIM so we can add
>> new hashes and signing algorithms.
>
> Precisely my point.  If that was successful (and it seems like it is
> at least on face value), then a new signing algorithm could be done by
> basically anyone.

Of course, but if the signers and verifiers don't agree on how the 
algorithm is represented in signatures and keys, it won't be very useful.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly