Re: [dispatch] draft-winterbottom-dispatch-locparam

["DRAGE, Keith (Keith)" <[e-mail]>]

I've now read all the versions of meeting notes distributed.

None of these expand on Cullen's privacy concern, so perhaps he could elaborate.

I would state that:

1)	the trust statements in the document relate only to the additional header field. The privacy requirements on the remainder of the Geolocation header field are unchanged.

2)	for SIP deployments that use trust, neither the trust nor the entities involved in that trust are the same for every header field. So the trust for RFC 3325 is: a) on the sender to trust that the recipient to apply any "id" privacy indicated; b) on the recipient that they trust the sender to assert the identity. For this draft, the only trust required is that the receiver trusts the sender to assert that the new header field parameter was applied by a "originating telephony or electronic communications service provider".

3)	I do not believe there is any privacy issue about the recipient receiving information that any contained Geolocation header field came from a "originating telephony or electronic communications service provider" as opposed to anywhere else. If there is, then the trust requirements could be altered in the same manner as already used for a number of 3GPP specific header fields.

Keith

> -----Original Message-----
> From: DRAGE, Keith (Keith) 
> Sent: 22 July 2015 10:17
> To: [e-mail]
> Subject: draft-winterbottom-dispatch-locparam
> 
> Issues from the dispatch meeting discussion:
> 
> 1)	In regard to trust, what is needed is a mechanism to 
> meet the following from the EC mandate:
> 
> ". The enhancement, i.e. location data provision, is expected 
> to be determined by the originating telephony or electronic 
> communications service provider, capable of originating voice 
> calls through a number or numbers in national telephone 
> numbering plans, and be provided at call setup to the PSAP as 
> soon as the call reaches the authority handling the emergency calls."
> 
> The proposal in the document is that the recipient of a SIP 
> request will either know that the entity that sent or proxied 
> the SIP request is either an "originating telephony or 
> electronic communications service provider" or trusts that 
> entity to make a proper discrimination of that.
> 
> Relying on certificates or known domain names would require 
> PSAPs and networks routeing emergency calls to have a 
> maintained database of all known "originating telephony or 
> electronic communications service provider" worldwide.
> 
> 2)	The question was raised as to whether it should be 
> specific for emergency call. I see no reason why it should 
> be. It does not interfere with the location itself, or the 
> privacy of the location itself. Further, I have a concern of 
> any protocol mechanism that is emergency call specific, as it 
> never gets tested until one wants to make an emergency call.
> 
> 3)	I believe Cullen mentioned privacy, but I am not sure 
> in what context. The mechanism does not interfere with any of 
> the privacy requirements defined for the Geolocation header 
> field. Further if the trust in 1) above is not met, it is 
> only the parameter that is removed, not the Geolocation 
> header field itself.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Keith