[dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP — Adaptive Security Framework for HTTP/HTTPS
Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 03 July 2025 09:35 UTC
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From: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 03 Jul 2025 10:34:50 +0100
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To: Rachid Bouziane <contact@secroot.io>
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Subject: [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP — Adaptive Security Framework for HTTP/HTTPS
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Hi Rachid, Without comment on the broader proposal, may I draw your attention to RFC 6648: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6648. This is a BCP recommending against the use of X- headers and similar constructs. Whatever the dispatch outcome, I suggest you consider its advice in updates to your design. best regards, Ted Hardie On Thu, Jul 3, 2025 at 2:45 AM Rachid Bouziane <contact@secroot.io> wrote: > Thanks a lot for your question. > > DOTS focuses on signaling volumetric DDoS attacks to a mitigation > server, typically via a dedicated control channel. > OODA-HTTP, in contrast, introduces a behavioral layer directly inside > HTTP/HTTPS to allow each HTTP request to carry lightweight telemetry > (via the X-OODA-Action header), enabling real-time context-aware > response at the edge (block, challenge, rotate TLS keys, etc.). > > It's more about individual behavioral defense (e.g. against bots, > anomalous clients) than large-scale DDoS signaling. > We see it as complementary to DOTS, acting inside the HTTP/TLS runtime, > not outside. > > Happy to elaborate further if helpful. > > Best regards, > Rachid Bouziane > SecRoot.io — OODA-HTTP Initiative > > _______________________________________________ > dispatch mailing list -- dispatch@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to dispatch-leave@ietf.org >
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… worley
- [dispatch] Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP — Ada… Rachid Bouziane
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… Lucas Pardue
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… Rachid Bouziane
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… Ted Hardie
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… Mark Nottingham
- [dispatch] Re: Proposal for New Work: OODA-HTTP —… John C Klensin