Re: [dispatch] [Secdispatch] A protocol for anonymity

[Martin <[e-mail]>]

Hi Rich

Thanks for your concern. I understand where it is coming from. The
reason why Security Considerations are so small is that there is another
(academia) document dealing mainly with the security of the protocol.
Although the thesis has not been published (still needs lecturing, a
couple of attentive eyes questioning everything, and extension of some
sections), it is linked in the document, and you may read it. I felt
that including this into the RFC is too much by far. I, therefore,
referenced it in the first paragraph. Do you think that this was the
wrong decision?

You made definitely a valid point: Why believe a single person (in terms
of an administrator of a system or writer of a paper)? My reply is: You
should not. Read it and build your own opinion. There are a lot of minor
flaws in the protocol depending on how your adversary looks like. A lot
of "do's" and "donts's." If you are looking for the "why's" then reading
[MVAnalysis] is mandatory.

Another main problem is censorship resistance. The more you regulate the
behavior of the node, the easier it is to identify nodes (at least in
some points). I, therefore, tried to integrate all absolute mandatory
rules and to leave freedom to all other rules. I am sure willing to
change that decision if you think it should be entirely included in the
document instead of linking, but the document is already far from being
lightweight.

Regards
Martin


Am 11.03.2019 um 03:20 schrieb Salz, Rich:
>>    https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gwerder-messagevortexmain/
>   
> I am VERY concerned about publishing something that claims to be a protocol for anonymity that has no security analysis and seems to be the work of one person.
>