Re: [dmarc-ietf] Report bombing is a prolem, Forensic report loops are not

[Alessandro Vesely <[e-mail]>]

On Sun 31/Jan/2021 21:02:38 +0100 John Levine wrote:
> In article <[e-mail]> you write:
>>Rate limiting usually implies a number of buckets.  They are managed by 
>>imposing limits per time periods, which can be either server-global or per 
>>bucket.  Normally, for MSA usage, one has one bucket per user.  I have never 
>>implemented failure reporting, but I'd guess buckets may vary.  Besides the 
>>signing domain (which determines the report consumer), the receiving address, 
>>the sender and the spam flag may deserve their own buckets.
> 
> The only one that matters for DMARC reporting is the recipient
> address, since the purpose of rate limiting is to avoid overloading
> the recipient mail system. I wouldn't worry about trying to send a
> "representative" set of reports.
> 
> Keep in mind that very few people send failure reports at all.


True, it's not worth suggesting a super duper rate limiting.

Committed text:


3.3.  Transport

    Email streams carrying DMARC failure reports MUST conform to the
    DMARC mechanism, thereby resulting in an aligned "pass".  Special
    care must be taken of authentication, as failure to authenticate
    failure reports may result in mail loops.

    Reporters SHOULD rate limit the number of failure reports sent to any
    recipient to avoid overloading recipient systems.


Not MUST?

Best
Ale
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