Re: [dmarc-ietf] dmarc and forwarding

Steven M Jones <smj@crash.com> Fri, 31 January 2014 08:01 UTC

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Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 00:00:59 -0800
From: Steven M Jones <smj@crash.com>
Organization: Crash Computing, Inc.
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] dmarc and forwarding
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On 01/30/2014 10:38 PM, Mike Jones wrote:
>
> [The] thing about spoofing is that one never knows when one will 
> become a victim.  We often see domains that go periods of time without 
> a spoofing issue and then are hit hard on one day.

I'd like to reinforce this point from experience as a domain owner. At a 
major financial institution, we put SPF "-all" and DMARC "p=reject" 
records on some domains that had been retired a several years earlier. 
These domains seldom saw more than 1,000 messages per month - again, 
none from or authorized by the owning organization - but they were 
prominent names you would recognize, and this seemed like a prudent 
precaution.

Sure enough, one holiday weekend somebody tried to send over 1.75 
million messages using one of these domains. While we surely weren't 
receiving reports from every domain receiving the spoofed messages, from 
the receivers that did report - including Microsoft, AOL, Google, and 
Yahoo - over 99.5% of those messages never reached an inbox. And I can 
tell you, we did not see blocking rates that high from similar domains 
where we had not put DMARC policies in place, no matter how lame the 
fraudulent messages were.

--Steve.