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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Mon, 21 December 2020 18:06 UTC

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To: John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com>, dmarc@ietf.org
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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2020 19:06:34 +0100
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/38pbCg_tkNlk13bWP6kgTwH8cEg>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports
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On Mon 21/Dec/2020 18:28:06 +0100 John R Levine wrote:
> On Mon, 21 Dec 2020, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>>>> Keeping the target of forwarded messages private needs to be addressed at 
>>>> emailcore as well, though.  Regular bounces leak the same info.
>>>
>>> That seems like a great way to destroy mailing lists by not telling them 
>>> which recipients are bouncing.
>>
>> Temporary failures (over quota) don't hurt mailing lists.  Permanent failures 
>> (target account takedown) deserve bounces right from the forwarding address.
> 
> Um, the mailing list *is* the forwarding address.


Oh, well, no, in that case the target address is not meant to be kept secret.


> In any event, I think we agree that failure reports are not worth a lot of 
> effort here.


I'd look for ways to trim them down a bit.  Just enough to let them be 
privacy-wise credible.  Besides skipping forwarded stuff (including mailing 
list) and an enable-by-domain feature, avoiding external addresses in ruf= 
could be another simplification.  Not worth?


Best
Ale
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