Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com> Thu, 08 June 2023 20:03 UTC

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From: Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2023 16:02:48 -0400
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To: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
Cc: Seth Blank <seth=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Tobias Herkula <tobias.herkula=401und1.de@dmarc.ietf.org>, "dmarc@ietf.org" <dmarc@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal
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On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 10:44 AM Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org> wrote:

> See, I don't look at it as "harmed".  Rather, I think they're using "we
> use SPF" as a *reason* not to use DKIM, and I think that *causes* harm.
>

That might be true but does not address whether or not SPF is/can be useful
in the context of DMARC validation.


>
> SPF is, as I see it, worse than useless, as it adds no value to domain
> that use DKIM -- any time DKIM fails SPF will also fail -- and actually
> impedes the adoption of DKIM.  Reliance on SPF causes DMARC failures that
> result in deliverability problems for legitimate mail.  I wholeheartedly
> support removal of SPF as an authentication mechanism that DMARC accepts.
>

I'm going to disagree with you on this, having experience with billions of
emails sent with both SPF and DKIM used in the context of DMARC validation.
A sender using both SPF and DMARC will see a slight boost in validation
rates due to increased resiliency when there are transient DNS failures and
other problems. A small percentage of a very large number is still a large
number. Let's not throw the baby out with the bath water.

>
> Barry, as participant
>

Michael Hammer


>
> On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 3:30 PM Seth Blank <seth=
> 40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Participating, I have data that I believe points to a long tail of
>> businesses who predominantly only authenticate on behalf of others using
>> SPF, and would be harmed by such a change. It will take me a little while
>> to confirm and share.
>>
>> I also know a predominant ccTLD with millions of registrations, that has
>> SPF on roughly 80% of them, but DMARC on barely 5%. I don't have data on
>> DKIM for those, but I assume it's closer to the DMARC penetration than the
>> SPF one. I'll see if I can get this data to share more publically, and also
>> get the DKIM answer.
>>
>> Of course the goal is aligned dkim with a stated policy, but I don't
>> think the data supports us being anywhere close to that realistically.
>>
>> As Chair, this is a valuable conversation to have with real data on
>> problems and opportunities at scale, and am excited to see Tobias share and
>> see what others have to say.
>>
>> Seth
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 3:21 PM Murray S. Kucherawy <superuser@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 6:00 AM Tobias Herkula <tobias.herkula=
>>> 401und1.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> My team recently concluded an extensive study on the current use and
>>>> performance of DMARC. We analyzed a staggering 3.2 billion emails, and the
>>>> insights drawn are quite enlightening. Of these, 2.2 billion emails
>>>> (approximately 69%) passed the DMARC check successfully. It's quite an
>>>> achievement, reflective of our collective hard work in fostering a safer,
>>>> more secure email environment.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> However, upon further analysis, it's evident that a mere 1.6% (or
>>>> thirty-six million) of these DMARC-passed emails relied exclusively on the
>>>> Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for validation. This is a remarkably low
>>>> volume compared to the overall DMARC-passed traffic, raising questions
>>>> about SPF's relevancy and the load it imposes on the DNS systems.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Given the current use case scenarios and the desire to optimize our
>>>> resources, I propose that we explore the possibility of removing the SPF
>>>> dependency from DMARC. This step could result in a significant reduction in
>>>> DNS load, increased efficiency, and an accurate alignment with our
>>>> predominant use cases.
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>
>>> Does anyone have consonant (or dissonant) data?
>>>
>>> -MSK, participating
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> dmarc mailing list
>>> dmarc@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> *Seth Blank * | Chief Technology Officer
>> *e:* seth@valimail.com
>> *p:* 415.273.8818
>>
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