Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #42 - Expand DMARC reporting URI functionality

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Tue, 26 January 2021 17:27 UTC

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To: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>, John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #42 - Expand DMARC reporting URI functionality
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On Tue 26/Jan/2021 18:23:35 +0100 Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 26, 2021 at 9:16 AM John R Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
> 
>>>> Sheesh.  That isn't mission creep, it's mission gallop.
>>> The spec can be commissioned to a narrowly focused WG (like dcrup).
>>
>> Really, no.  It's something we might think about on its own merits some
>> other time, but its absurd to try to do it as a detour from DMARC.
> 
> +1.  I don't see why we wouldn't just recharter this group (if that would
> even be necessary) to do it.  The right audience is already here.


Doing it now might overload the WG.  If DKIM for binary has its own merit, we 
can just hypothesize we'll do.  Meanwhile we can mention it and suggest to use 
it for https: when it comes, if ever.  After all, that's what RFC 2045 does 
with "binary".


Best
Ale
--