Re: [dmarc-ietf] Which DKIM(s) should be reported? (Ticket #38)

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Wed, 27 January 2021 12:33 UTC

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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Which DKIM(s) should be reported? (Ticket #38)
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On Wed 27/Jan/2021 12:31:51 +0100 Douglas Foster wrote:
> Is this already a settled issue?


There doesn't seem to be a consensus, yet.

I repeat what I already proposed:

*  max number of DKIM signatures: 1024 (say)
*  min number of DKIM signatures: 0
*  can report unverified signatures (<result>none</result>)
*  order signatures by descreasing importance (reporter POV)

Would the WG post some +/-1s, please?


> - Another approach, based on E.F.Codd's data normalization rules for relational 
> databases, is to have a table of messages which is keyed on a message ID, and a 
> table of signatures, which is keyed on message ID and sequence number.   Then 
> an outer join can be used to append the list element with sequence number # to 
> the message record.   A separate outer join is required for each sequence 
> number being appended, so the implementation must choose a maximum number of 
> list elements to append.   One recent poster said that he was using this 
> approach.    Outer joins are generally inefficient, and this approach might 
> work for up to 4 list elements, but it will not work acceptable for a list with 
> 100 elements.


Could fill the whole list using transitive closure.  MariaDB implements 
Recursive Common Table Expressions, which can be used for that purpose. 
Although that feature was implemented in 2016, it landed on the distribution I 
use quite recently.  I haven't yet looked at it.


> For report sources with a fixed limit, it seems appropriate to have a metadata 
> element where the report provider states the maximum number of signatures that 
> might be reported by his system.   An indicator would be needed to indicate 
> "many, with no pre-determined limit"


It is probably more useful to report the total number of signatures found.  The 
fixed limit of a given implementation can be deduced after it is hit.

OTOH, a reference to the software version that generated the report would be 
useful in general, and may lead to the documented fixed number in particular.


Best
Ale
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