Re: [dmarc-ietf] Debugging and preventing DKIM failures- suggestion

"Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com> Thu, 30 May 2019 18:20 UTC

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References: <54FB29A0-517A-430E-AF5B-CB079CC3D7F6@aegee.org> <20190526144848.08A772014A0BF4@ary.qy>
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From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 11:20:41 -0700
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To: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
Cc: IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>, Дилян Палаузов <Dilyan.Palauzov@aegee.org>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Debugging and preventing DKIM failures- suggestion
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On Sun, May 26, 2019 at 7:49 AM John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:

> In article <54FB29A0-517A-430E-AF5B-CB079CC3D7F6@aegee.org> you write:
> >-=-=-=-=-=-
> >
> >Hello Douglas,
> >
> >1) Check the Authentication-Results header. An implementation could put
> there additional information as comment. A
> >downstream MTA will reevaluate the DKIM-Signature anyway, if it does nkt
> trust the previous hop. Common case: aliases
> >to random servers.
>
> That would be my suggestion.  You can put whatever you want into comments
> in the A-R header.
>

At one point in the early DKIM days we were discussing a way to have DKIM
verifiers return enough information to signers to indicate what the
mutation was that invalidated a message.  This was supremely useful in the
early days of DKIM when we were just figuring out how to interoperate; if I
keep a copy of the the canonicalized header and body of something outbound,
and then on receipt you find the signature doesn't validate, then you send
me the canonicalized header and body you saw, and I get to diff them to see
what mutation broke the signature.

We ended up with RFC6651 and the ones to which it references.  OpenDKIM
implements this, but I don't think any other implementation does, so its
use is obviously very limited.

And as John said, there have been numerous proposals over the years of ways
to annotate a message with what "standard" mutations were done so that at
verification time the receiver could decide which mutations it was willing
to forgive, but the community showed no interest in such complexities.

-MSK