Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com> Tue, 05 January 2021 20:05 UTC

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To: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>, dmarc@ietf.org
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From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 05 Jan 2021 12:04:59 -0800
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports
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On 1/5/2021 11:34 AM, Michael Thomas wrote:
> On 1/5/21 11:22 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
>> From: header field rewriting demonstrates that DMARC is, indeed, 
>> trivial to defeat (or rather, to route around.)  Also, receiver 
>> filtering engines are all that matter.  Real-time actions by 
>> recipients are demonstrably irrelevant to DMARC (and all other 
>> anti-abuse) utility.
>>
> That's not the conclusion of the paper that Doug Foster linked to the 
> other day.


1. I've looked back over his postings to this mailing list and am not 
finding the link you refer to.  Please post it (again).

2. A single study is unlikely to be definitive about much of anything.

3. Especially when it counters years of experience, including the Web EV 
experiment:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate

>
>       Effectiveness against phishing attacks with IE7 security UI
>
> In 2006, researchers at Stanford University 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_University> and Microsoft 
> Research <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Research> conducted 
> a usability study^[21] 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate#cite_note-21> 
> of the EV display in Internet Explorer 7 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Explorer_7>. Their paper 
> concluded that "participants who received no training in browser 
> security features did not notice the extended validation indicator and 
> did not outperform the control group", whereas "participants who were 
> asked to read the Internet Explorer help file were more likely to 
> classify both real and fake sites as legitimate". 


> When I first came back and saw the From rewriting I was very confused 
> by what it was until I figured out what was going on. 

You think you are representative of end users?  Try again.


d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
dcrocker@gmail.com
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