Re: [dmarc-ietf] Working Group Last Call: draft-ietf-dmarc-psd

Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com> Sat, 13 July 2019 19:06 UTC

Return-Path: <sklist@kitterman.com>
X-Original-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 723B412017E for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 13 Jul 2019 12:06:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.101
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.101 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=neutral reason="invalid (unsupported algorithm ed25519-sha256)" header.d=kitterman.com header.b=68FxRLTp; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kitterman.com header.b=kZknTAaZ
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vzICxb4dKNC0 for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 13 Jul 2019 12:06:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from interserver.kitterman.com (interserver.kitterman.com [64.20.48.66]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B23A120157 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 13 Jul 2019 12:06:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from interserver.kitterman.com (interserver.kitterman.com [64.20.48.66]) by interserver.kitterman.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5D875F80689 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 13 Jul 2019 15:06:01 -0400 (EDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kitterman.com; i=@kitterman.com; q=dns/txt; s=201903e; t=1563044761; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding : content-type : from; bh=GBW+yGjcZd6tKqQVKSrdT4afqyr2hFybKo1oc1ESFHI=; b=68FxRLTpglE8QzYH3h9ZLDc+sLamEVSb1NcGRJuh1BbFH2lcjoNlceMe VX6U1ei4fi/NKy23USz25im/tUCoBw==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kitterman.com; i=@kitterman.com; q=dns/txt; s=201903r; t=1563044761; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding : content-type : from; bh=GBW+yGjcZd6tKqQVKSrdT4afqyr2hFybKo1oc1ESFHI=; b=kZknTAaZxiAdwJhiatIqlPgUqUTeRH0p20J/Lo5zORI4Cn8SuN+1HhR2 D89N/DmMpZgAaTEm9BzqLo7zI6icQQbxhyHaZ7ZkaWKBv2M3O+ENiSNsKF Z4aGZE/lKBzMCRU8nb0E9tjESa8aqIm+695BhN51L2MzYMIxrhuf3sKdy0 wooFROY79mVzfeXQz6H5vg56wUwY0pKkN8w+tbjrxpSPTXMFKth1DpIlv6 Dml2MBPVwVyUlw3P8tYmIRmBE4FIWDTA84cAZ+kyDcvtufE027VGA0uVVo RIaMjV6gSERYxh73kb3EQGxJc8wfoBn15RERQwDArMJzZjU1EcVDDw==
Received: from l5580.localnet (static-72-81-252-22.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net [72.81.252.22]) by interserver.kitterman.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2D096F80607 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 13 Jul 2019 15:06:01 -0400 (EDT)
From: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
To: dmarc@ietf.org
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2019 15:06:00 -0400
Message-ID: <1834844.gVztEOuzS9@l5580>
In-Reply-To: <c94a1ccd-3d6f-6100-8401-90c78e8b0355@tana.it>
References: <CAL0qLwbbz_UhBLsURg=eXhRBC2g9OghiN==T9Uq9pFuLtd=b7w@mail.gmail.com> <1851683.DtEN5jD5Wj@l5580> <c94a1ccd-3d6f-6100-8401-90c78e8b0355@tana.it>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/_WjDZj17qySDLcIWlcCIan54s0A>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Working Group Last Call: draft-ietf-dmarc-psd
X-BeenThere: dmarc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Compliance \(DMARC\)" <dmarc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dmarc/>
List-Post: <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2019 19:06:04 -0000

On Saturday, July 13, 2019 1:22:15 PM EDT Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> On Fri 12/Jul/2019 19:30:35 +0200 Scott Kitterman wrote:
> > On Thursday, July 11, 2019 6:07:50 AM EDT Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> >>> 2. If explicit call outs to ICANN/limited operator capacity to
> >>> implement are needed
> >> 
> >> Appendix B.1 lacks a criterion to establish enlisting.  Couldn't we
> >> require an explicit statement about seizing DMARC reports in, say, the
> >> delegation report?  Alternatively, that policy can be stated in a
> >> well-known place under the delegation services URL, so that
> >> registrants know what they do.
> > 
> > It's in the appendix because we don't have a clear path forward.  This is
> > part of the experiment.  We need to be careful though since different
> > PSDs operate under different authorities and controls, so there is a
> > point beyond which it's not the IETF that decides.
> 
> I should have written more clearly the two issues.  One is the
> criterion.  I hypothesized that all what is needed to gran enlistment
> to a PSO is that its policy to seize DMARC at PSD level be published,
> so that registrant can learn about is before registering.  Is that
> correct?  I mean does a public statement suffice?
> 
> 
> The second issue is how to publish. In case the answer to the 1st
> question is yes, would https://PSO.tld/.well-known/dmarc-psd/policy do?

I don't think we want a novel policy record location for PSD.  We did discuss 
this and concluded _dmarc.PSD is appropriate to remain aligned to DMARC.

In my view the challenge around which PSDs receivers should check for a PSD 
DMARC record needs to be external to the PSD (i.e. not a self-assertion).  
Some options are presented in Appendix A.  If, as a result of the experiment, 
it's concluded that self-assertion is acceptable, then all that's needed is to 
publish the record.  I don't think we need a second place to look up to tell 
receivers to do the record lookup.

Scott K