Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #1 - SPF alignment

Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com> Sat, 30 January 2021 21:27 UTC

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References: <bef64e7a-571b-a73f-dc91-aa402ca320c8@taugh.com> <1655426.E2olI3CrJK@zini-1880> <c39916f8-33f5-9876-c018-53085f5cc8f5@tana.it> <3776619.NdRDDhGtae@zini-1880> <81ab38a1-4b0a-3845-fc8c-7d49d7850c26@tana.it> <CAL0qLwZgB4iVSudbJeh8NGiKd1232SBTy4YDG6Zj-=LV+1m6Uw@mail.gmail.com> <fc735412-dfa2-20c8-087f-727b13eb3ad5@tana.it> <CAL0qLwbYxTXXXpx11L3f1CqBns=fSRho3C+S7q=-DmiPSvxKvg@mail.gmail.com> <cf51d6d4-0c7b-971d-bcac-743370f16433@tana.it> <CAL0qLwYK7SFfV5fOb7qhy5hVgR15z4HEJbAHv38OFMAfC=_j-Q@mail.gmail.com> <CF0B307A-C83A-4FF9-BC03-9DE28362DF3A@bluepopcorn.net>
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From: Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 16:27:02 -0500
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To: IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #1 - SPF alignment
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As long as Helo is forward confirmed to the source IP, why is it a risk to
use it to indicate the domain name?

On Sat, Jan 30, 2021, 2:59 PM Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> wrote:

> On 29 Jan 2021, at 12:30, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 3:02 AM Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> I just run a quick test on my current folder.  Out of 3879 messages I
> >> extracted
> >> 944 unique helo names.  721 of these matched the reverse lookup
> >> exactly.
> >> Out
> >> of the 223 remaining, 127 had an SPF pass for the helo identity
> >> anyway.
> >> So in
> >> 96 cases, roughly 10%, the helo name was indeed junk.  Isn't the
> >> remaining
> >> ~90%
> >> something worth considering?
>
> The issue isn’t the existing use of HELO names, it’s how they could
> be (mis-)used. The fact that a message sender can put anything there
> makes HELO basically meaningless.
>
> > I am admittedly quite heavily biased against using the HELO/EHLO value
> > for
> > anything.  I have simply never found value in it, probably because at
> > the
> > SMTP layer it's simply a value that gets logged or used in cute ways
> > in the
> > human-readable portion of SMTP.  I seem to recall (but cannot seem to
> > find
> > at the moment) RFC 5321 saying you can't reject HELO/EHLO based on a
> > bogus
> > value, so it's even explicitly not useful to me.
> >
> > Even if it's not junk, there's pretty much always something else on
> > which
> > to hang a pass/fail decision about the apparent authenticity of a
> > message
> > that at least feels safer if not actually being more sound.  Or put
> > another
> > way, if you present to me a DKIM-signed message with a MAIL FROM value
> > and
> > the only thing that passes is an SPF check against HELO, I'm mighty
> > skeptical.
> >
> > Anyway, I'll let consensus fall where it may.
>
> +1 to Murray’s comments. I realize that null MAIL FROM on bounce
> messages is a problem for SPF, but relying on HELO is  not a reasonable
> substitute.
>
> -Jim
>
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