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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Sat, 02 January 2021 12:08 UTC

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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports
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On Thu 31/Dec/2020 19:36:15 +0100 Michael Thomas wrote:
> On 12/31/20 10:22 AM, John R Levine wrote:
>>>> To what?  The Yahoo address is the only address the scout troop has?
>>>
>>> Copy that to Reply-To: and write a mangled From: that looks troopy but 
>>> passes DMARC.  Just like MLMs do.
>>
>> Lists at MLMs have names that the subscribers will recognize, but the scout 
>> troop only has the Yahoo address.
>>
>> There are certainly kludges that one can apply to circumvent DMARC 
>> rejections, but this is a clear failure, an existing legitimate mail use that 
>> DMARC breaks.
>>
>>
> The entire problem with catering to the long tail is that it is holding hostage 
> better email security. We should stop doing that. There is no right to stasis 
> forevermore. If the scouts email breaks, they can get somebody to fix it. They 
> will thank us in the long run when scammers can't phish using them as a prop.


I agree.  Setting p=none makes DMARC non-actionable.  I, for one, keep p=none 
because of mailing lists.

MLMs seem to be much better than ESPs, since their From: rewriting solves DMARC 
problems effectively, creating only an acceptable noise.

I added two new tickets:
https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dmarc/ticket/92
https://trac.ietf.org/trac/dmarc/ticket/93


Best
Ale
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