Re: [dmarc-ietf] Recipient domain in aggregate reports (#23)

To address Laura's concerns about individual targeting, the reporting needs
to ensure a minimum level of aggregation on all reports.

This starts with MailFrom.   If less than N unique recipient addresses are
included, the report should not be sent at all

If a DKIM selector occurs on less than N unique recipient addresses, the
DKIM selector should be replaced with * or Null.

I do not have a strong opinion about N, but am thinking 10.

Doug Foster

On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 4:49 AM Laura Atkins <laura@wordtothewise.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 3 May 2021, at 07:27, Hans-Martin Mosner <hmm@heeg.de> wrote:
>
> Am 02.05.21 um 22:30 schrieb John Levine:
>
> It appears that Matthäus Wander <mail@wander.science> said:
>
> envelope_to allows you to automatically correlate these reports and
> reconstruct the forwarding path. This helps to identify the culprit who
> is breaking DKIM signatures, especially with longer forwarding chains.
> Without envelope_to, reconstructing the mail flow requires guessing and
> manual work.
>
> It is none of your business to whom I forward my mail.
>
>
> True, unless you (generic you, not John L.) make it my business by
> complaining about not receiving my mail either in a
> support request (which may cause quite some work) or in a public forum
> (which might damage my reputation and even cause
> more work).
>
>
> I will point out that for a lot of us online (specifically those of us who
> don’t check any or all of the the cis-het-white-male categories) forwarding
> mail and protecting our identities are crucial to our ability to actually
> participate in an online life. Stalking and harassment are real. I,
> personally, have been being low-level stalked by someone for over a decade
> now. I have been put into positions where I have to make calculated
> decisions about my ability to participate in places based on my personal
> safety. I have involved the police in the past for specific threats against
> me. The first time I was threatened and stalked online was more than 20
> years ago. This is not some ‘oh, it only happens to some people’, it
> happens to a lot of people, regularly.
>
> The threats I’ve had to deal with, just for being a woman in an online
> environment, are minor compared to some threats other women, BIPOC and
> members of other marginalized groups have had to put up with. I’ve never
> had to move out of my house for my safety. ISPs HAVE doxxed individuals in
> the past, both accidentally and through deliberate policy decisions. Adding
> personally identifiable information into DMARC reports is problematic in a
> way I don’t think many men here realize.
>
> It is not anyone’s business how I might route mail to protect my safety.
> And, frankly, the issues of data privacy and safety for people online
> significantly trump the concern that someone’s reputation might be slightly
> impacted because they can’t troubleshoot an individual mail failure.
>
> I am too often in a position of being requested to solve a problem but the
> requestors don't even provide the minimal
> logging info or even error texts to even start analyzing their problem. In
> such cases I want to be able to look at as
> much info as possible so as to provide a decent service.
>
> I don't snoop on mail logging info to satisfy my curiosity or to increase
> my revenue, but to solve my user's problems.
>
>
> This is irrelevant. How, in fact, do you protect your users safety and
> privacy? How do you ensure that the request is actually coming from your
> user and not from someone attempting to discover where they are and defeat
> personal safety measures your user has put in place to protect themselves
> from harassment and stalking? Maybe they don’t provide the minimum logging
> info or texts because they’re attempting to social engineer you into
> revealing someone’s information and identity that forms a chain that leads
> to their safety being compromised.
>
> Whether envelope_to would help my work isn't clear, but apparently it
> would help Matthäus in his work.
>
>
> But is that work necessary and relevant? Does that process protect people?
> Does it faciliate online threats, harassment and stalking? Will someone who
> is trying to hide their location due to a credible threat be harmed by this
> protocol decision?
>
> laura
>
> --
> Having an Email Crisis?  We can help! 800 823-9674
>
> Laura Atkins
> Word to the Wise
> laura@wordtothewise.com
> (650) 437-0741
>
> Email Delivery Blog: https://wordtothewise.com/blog
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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