Re: [dmarc-ietf] Forensic report loops are a problem

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Mon, 01 February 2021 20:34 UTC

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To: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com>, dmarc@ietf.org
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 12:34:53 -0800
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Forensic report loops are a problem
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On 2/1/21 10:52 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
> On 2/1/2021 10:25 AM, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2/1/21 10:13 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
>>> The model that a receiving site is not allowed to report DMARC 
>>> traffic unless that site is also generating DMARC authentication is 
>>> Procrustean.  And as I noted, is likely counter-productive. 
>>
>> There is no such thing as "DMARC authentication".
>>
> Actually, there is.  DMARC's requirement for alignment with the 
> author's From: field domain name asserts a specific bit of 
> authenticated semantics that does not exist elsewhere.
>
>
>> The paragraph quoted is poorly written and should be rewritten to say 
>> that the report should pass either SPF or DKIM authentication as I 
>> wrote in issue #98.
>>
> It might be written better, but its requirement is for support of 
> applying DMARC to generated reports.  That's more than just requiring 
> SPF or DKIM.
>
> This is separate from not asserting the requirement at all, of course.
>
The entire thrust of the paragraph needs to be rewritten to what the 
senders and receivers must do. It does not require invoking the policy 
lookup since it can make the determination to reject reports that do not 
authenticate with either SPF or DKIM itself. The section also needs to 
clarify whether spoofing the envelope-to domain in the report contents 
is allowed or not. I do not think it should be.

Mike