Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake reports are not a problem and if they were authentication would not help
Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Mon, 25 January 2021 17:22 UTC
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To: Seth Blank <seth@valimail.com>, IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>
Cc: Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com>
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 09:22:27 -0800
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake reports are not a problem and if they were authentication would not help
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Taking in information from unauthenticated sources and acting on it is an operational problem per se. Have we learned nothing in the last 30 years? Mike On 1/25/21 9:19 AM, Seth Blank wrote: > What operational problem are we solving here? Absent evidence of a > problem and strong consensus on the solution, let's close these > tickets and move on. > > On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 9:10 AM Douglas Foster > <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com > <mailto:dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com>> wrote: > > Since the status quo is unauthenticated, I wonder if adding a > signing requirement will help. > Will recipients discad unsigned messages, or accept whatever is > available to maximize their information capture? I suspect they > will conrinye to accept everything. > > I think we would need an identified threat before recipients would > be motivated to discard. > > But what about John's problems with receiving reports that should > not have gone to him? I did not understand the root cause, but I > would hope there is something that can be done. Would signing > help receiving sites, those with less sophistication than he has, > be able to sort out noise more effectively? > > > On Mon, Jan 25, 2021, 11:51 AM Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com > <mailto:mike@mtcc.com>> wrote: > > > On 1/25/21 8:44 AM, Todd Herr wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 25, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Thomas >> <mike@mtcc.com <mailto:mike@mtcc.com>> wrote: >> >> >> The main thing I've learned over the years of dealing >> with security is to not underestimate what a motivated >> attacker can do. Your imagination is not the same as >> their imagination. Closing #98 in particular is >> absolutely ridiculous: the report should already have a >> DKIM signature or SPF so it's just a matter of making >> sure its valid. Why would you *not* want to insure that? >> The amount of justification for *not* having the receiver >> authenticate it is a mountain. The amount of effort to >> authenticate it is trivial for mail. Levine's dismissal >> of security concerns because he has anecdotal "evidence" >> from a backwater domain carries no weight at all. >> >> >> That's all well and good, but you haven't answered the >> question I asked. >> >> What threats do you have in mind? Put another way, how do you >> envision an attacker exploiting the lack of authentication in >> a DMARC report to his or her gain? >> > No, sorry, the onus is on the people who don't think it can be > gamed. A bald assertion that it can't be gamed is very > unconvincing. You need to lay out a miles long case for why it > cannot be gamed. And to what end? #98 has a simple piece of > text that should be added to DMARC to eliminate the > possibility of forgery. You'd need a 10 page threat I-D to > explain why it's not necessary. What is the point of that? For > email, it's trivial to prevent forgeries. Why would anybody > argue against that? > > Mike > > _______________________________________________ > dmarc mailing list > dmarc@ietf.org <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc> > > _______________________________________________ > dmarc mailing list > dmarc@ietf.org <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc> > > > > -- > *Seth Blank*| VP, Standards and New Technologies > *e:*seth@valimail.com <mailto:seth@valimail.com> > *p:*415.273.8818 > > > This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential > and/or proprietary information intended solely for the use of > individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and > authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, > copying or distribution of the information included in this > transmission is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately > notify the sender by replying to this email and then delete it from > your system. >
- [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake reports ar… John R. Levine
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Todd Herr
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Todd Herr
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Douglas Foster
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Todd Herr
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… John Levine
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… John Levine
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Douglas Foster
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Douglas Foster
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… John Levine
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Todd Herr
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… John R Levine
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Alessandro Vesely
- [dmarc-ietf] reporting security requirements Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] reporting security requirements Seth Blank
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] reporting security requirements Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Todd Herr
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Steven M Jones
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Michael Thomas
- Re: [dmarc-ietf] Tickets 98 and 99 -- fake report… Seth Blank