[dmarc-ietf] Should we encourage the use of SPF "soft include" for common platforms?

"Kurt Andersen (b)" <kboth@drkurt.com> Sat, 23 February 2019 18:07 UTC

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From: "Kurt Andersen (b)" <kboth@drkurt.com>
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2019 10:07:31 -0800
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To: "dmarc@ietf.org" <dmarc@ietf.org>
Cc: spfbis@ietf.org
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Subject: [dmarc-ietf] Should we encourage the use of SPF "soft include" for common platforms?
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With the growth of huge platforms that emit mail from the same common set
of IPs (such as GSuite, O365, or large ESPs), regular SPF "include" ends up
granting a DMARC pass to a lot more potential authors than most
organizations would necessarily choose to grant.

Instead of using the standard "(+)include:" approach, if domain owners used
"?include:" as their mechanism, then that would prevent the SPF result from
granting a DMARC PASS result when traffic is coming from one of these
massively included platforms. It would essentially force the DMARC result
to be driven only by the DKIM evaluation.

Thoughts?

--Kurt Andersen

(I'm copying the spfbis list too because there may be folks lurking there
who are not on the DMARC list)