Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01.txt

This is relevant to the Push Notification draft we’re trying to wrap up.

In the last paragraph of section 4, it says:
   Not all types of DNS queries are safe to be sent as early data.
   Clients MUST NOT use early data to send DNS Updates ([RFC2136]) or
   Zone Transfers ([RFC5936]) messages.  Servers receiving any of those
   messages MUST reply with a "FormErr" response code.

There isn’t a reason or reference for this claim of not being safe. Can the authors expand on this?

Thanks,
Tom

> On Jul 9, 2019, at 9:10 PM, Livingood, Jason <Jason_Livingood@comcast.com> wrote:
> 
> Just read it - very interesting! Is the bottom line essentially don't do DNS+TLS-1.3+0-RTT? Basically, since 1-RTT isn't a big performance problem, why take the risk of 0-RTT?
> 
> JL
> 
> On 7/6/19, 12:50 PM, "dns-privacy on behalf of Alessandro Ghedini" <dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of alessandro@ghedini.me> wrote:
> 
>    Hello,
> 
>    On Sat, Jul 06, 2019 at 09:19:41AM -0700, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>> A new version of I-D, draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Alessandro Ghedini and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>> 
>> Name:		draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data
>> Revision:	01
>> Title:		Using Early Data in DNS over TLS
>> Document date:	2019-07-06
>> Group:		Individual Submission
>> Pages:		5
>> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01.txt
>> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data/
>> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01
>> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data
>> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01
>> 
>> Abstract:
>>   This document illustrates the risks of using TLS 1.3 early data with
>>   DNS over TLS, and specifies behaviors that can be adopted by clients
>>   and servers to reduce those risks.
> 
>    I've been looking for information about using TLS 1.3 0-RTT with DoT, but all I
>    could find was a discussion from over a year ago on the mailing list:
>    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dns-privacy/LKZeOAj7Y4fC-9hRcbX_4KVWu0Y
> 
>    So I wrote this document to try and document potential risks as well as capture
>    requirements for DoT implementations deciding to add support for 0-RTT (RFC8446
>    in Appendix E.5 says that "Application protocols MUST NOT use 0-RTT data without
>    a profile that defines its use).
> 
>    Most of the wording comes from RFC8470 and some content from the mailing list
>    discussion mentioned above, though there are still some things that need to be
>    filled in or expanded.
> 
>    In this new revision I expanded some of the sections as well as included some
>    editorial fixes.
> 
>    The draft is maintained on GitHub at:
>    https://github.com/ghedo/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data
> 
>    Would be interested to know what people think about this.
> 
>    Cheers
> 
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> 
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