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Re: [dns-privacy] Second Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op

Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com> Mon, 11 November 2019 11:37 UTC

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From: Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com>
In-Reply-To: <20191107155703.GA12098@nic.fr>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 11:37:34 +0000
Cc: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>, dns-privacy@ietf.org
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References: <CADyWQ+GirqA_VKYTAjGpV+aFMQiio2AAqtMX_2SRg45Crpf_-A@mail.gmail.com> <20191101103831.GA22563@sources.org> <7489BA67-4037-444D-AB10-71A3EECB98D5@sinodun.com> <20191107155703.GA12098@nic.fr>
To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Second Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op
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> On 7 Nov 2019, at 15:57, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2019 at 01:16:29PM +0000,
> Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com> wrote 
> a message of 241 lines which said:
> 
>> The current usage is the result of a discussion on the very first
>> version of the draft (draft-dickinson-dprive-bcp-op-00, June 2018)
>> and since then (limited) usage of RFC2119 language has been
>> present. There have been comments on both sides that the language
>> should be stronger and weaker and this was the compromise
>> outcome. The SHOULD does ripple through the document though as it
>> defines all the Mitigations listed in the later sections as being
>> recommended for minimal compliance. How much of an issue is this for
>> you?
> 
> Not too important. 
> 
>> I can understand this reading of it but item 1 you list above was
>> not at all the goal of this at all text. Perhaps this could be
>> better phrased as “A DNS privacy service should strive to engineer
>> encrypted services to the same availability level as any unencrypted
>> services they provide.”?
> 
> OK, fine.
> 

Thanks - will update!

Sara.

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