[dns-privacy] Fwd: Opportunistic encryption between recursive and authoritative servers

James <james.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 12 September 2020 13:19 UTC

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From: James <james.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2020 15:19:26 +0200
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Subject: [dns-privacy] Fwd: Opportunistic encryption between recursive and authoritative servers
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(resending this to the list, apologies Paul)

Thank you for writing this draft. Just two observations:

1. The absence of protocol agility bothers me - whilst I do not think the
use case described in this document lends to DoH in particular being
suitable, DoQUIC and not-yet-existent protocols could also be applicable.
Is there any reason besides simplicity you didn't consider using the ALPN
as identifier?

2. I disagree on the points around authentication and section 2 could be
updated to better encourage adopters to implement matching TLSA records for
the certificate they present during the TLS handshake - with a clear
statement that recursives are not required to query this record type before
TLS negotiation, nor explicitly fail if it mismatches.

- J

On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 at 22:39, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> wrote:

> Greetings. The discussion of encrypting the recursive to authoritative
> traffic keeps getting bogged down due to lack of use cases. Puneet and I
> would like to propose a specific use case (the desire to encrypt much more
> traffic, even if there could be an active attacker in the middle). With
> that in mind, we wrote up <
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic>gt;.
> The abstract says:
>   This document describes a method for a DNS recursive resolver to use
>   opportunistic encryption when communicating with authoritative
>   servers.  The method here is optional for both the recursive resolver
>   and the authoritative server.  A motivating use case for this method
>   is that more encryption on the Internet is better, and opportunistic
>   encryption is better than no encryption at all.  Nothing in this
>   method prevents use cases that require better encryption.
>
> We would like DPRIVE to adopt this, and we are open to suggestions on how
> to improve the protocol.
>
> --Paul Hoffman_______________________________________________
> dns-privacy mailing list
> dns-privacy@ietf.org
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>