Re: [dns-privacy] Second Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op

Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com> Mon, 11 November 2019 11:37 UTC

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From: Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com>
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Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 11:37:30 +0000
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To: Christoph <cm@appliedprivacy.net>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Second Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-dprive-bcp-op
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> On 7 Nov 2019, at 00:17, Christoph <cm@appliedprivacy.net> wrote:
> 
> Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:> * "A DNS privacy service must be engineered
> for high availability."
>> I'm not in favor of this sentence. 1) It seems to despise small 
>> resolvers managed by small organisations, while we need many diverse 
>> DoT and DoH resolvers, to avoid centralisation 2) Today, Firefox, 
>> unfortunately, does not allow to add more than one DoH resolver,
>> which makes the DoH resolver a very critical resource. But I hope
>> that in the future, we will be able to configure several resolvers,
>> with an efficient fallback, making the issue of availability less
>> important.
> 
> I second that.
> 
>> “A DNS privacy service should strive to engineer encrypted services
>> to the same availability level as any unencrypted services they
>> provide.”?
> 
> Sounds good to me.

Thanks.

> 
>> * DROP is not a perfect acronym 
> +1
> maybe "DROPS”?

Right now it is ‘DNS Recursive Operator Privacy’ statement. I think if we added ’Security’ (as I think you are suggesting) then I suspect a comment would be that it should include a lot more than it currently does if it is to cover all aspects of ’security’ because that is a broad term…...

> 
>> "be held only memory"
> 
> "in memory.."

Fixed!

Sara.