Re: [dns-privacy] Common Features for Encrypted Recursive to Authoritative DNS

["Hollenbeck, Scott" <[e-mail]>]

From: dns-privacy <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Ben Schwartz
Sent: Monday, May 3, 2021 5:07 PM
To: Peter van Dijk <[e-mail]>
Cc: DNS Privacy Working Group <[e-mail]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [dns-privacy] Common Features for Encrypted Recursive to Authoritative DNS



Thanks for this draft; I think it's clear and could be a helpful introduction.



>    If the cache has no positive or negative answers for any DNS SVCB

   record for any of a zone's authoritative servers, the resolver needs
   to send queries for the DNS SVCB records for some or all of the
   zone's authoritative servers.



I think it would be worth rephrasing the words "needs to" here.  To me, this sounds like a normative requirement to perform these queries, but I suspect that's not what you mean.



>    Because some authoritative servers or middleboxes are misconfigured,
   requests for unknown RRtypes might be ignored by them.  Resolvers
   should be ready to deal with timeouts or other bad responses to their
   SVCB queries.



This sounds a bit pessimistic.  Ralf Weber recently published some figures showing a ~0.03% failure rate.  For security (in the authenticated case), any mitigations here are very delicate, and I'm a bit concerned about the brief treatment here.  (The SVCB draft has an extensive discussion: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https#section-3.1<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1KnxioJRTsf2uU1VW48qiLA_fHonJvyIlr7lqXBxF6-KQR8Euua8L4CgmpRZkuoe3cS_yTHaQPg9FD3nkj_RHY-7yCOcDuoR0vc6wkDa4uosV1tNCYOe3JcJGQw4KVsb_RRkzvTdQzxZbbHaeKPNC-UoXqfqMnCJOBub4XxG4JGbTo9MgdOEOKuLYS5gLGHiTqG9dVKWxkkqoBQ-9y8O0rUmFU45Xz9IAIBDvgTzxMUs3l2voDFu2pMpIcyVBnHF2/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https%23section-3.1>.)



>    DNS SVCB records act as advisory information for resolvers about the

   encrypted protocols that are supported.  They can be thought of as
   similar to NS records on the parent side of a zone cut: advisory
   enough to act on, but not authoritative.  Given this, authoritative
   servers that know the DNS SCVB records associated with NS records for
   any child zones MAY include those DNS SCVB records in the Additional
   section of responses to queries to a parent authoritative server.



This sounds like a restatement of the definition of "glue".  Can we simply declare that these records are "glue"?



[SAH] …and does this imply that we need to extend EPP to populate these records?



Scott