Re: [dns-privacy] Some additional signalling ideas

"Peter van Dijk" <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com> Fri, 05 April 2019 08:50 UTC

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From: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>
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Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2019 10:50:35 +0200
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Some additional signalling ideas
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On 31 Mar 2019, at 16:22, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:

> DS is signed, and has algorithm field. Supposedly unknown algorithms
> are ignored, but there are buggy nameservers out there that break if
> all DS entries have unknown algorithm. And turns out abusing DS
> records also runs into issues with "cloud" DNS provoders.

Do you know of any name servers out there that have a problem with it, 
other than Knot Resolver, 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8? (who all should be fixed 
soonish)

> Adding another RRtype with needed magic properties would take 
> Standards
> Action (as expert review requires RRtype not to be magic) and then
> updating parent nameservers to be able to deal with the RRtype (since
> it can not be generically handled). And trying to add extra fields to
> NS or DS is sure to cause horrible borkage.

I think adding fields might be even more painful than adding a new type. 
Neither seem feasible options to me.

> Adding records at child side of cut has its own issues, namely that
> retroactive authentication can be annoying to implement, and it is
> more difficult to make the thing work without full DNSSEC chain
> (glue records, if parent supports that?).

manu’s proposal explicitly targeted unsigned delegations, which I also 
think is an important use case.

Glue records are never signed.

Kind regards,
-- 
Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS.COM BV - https://www.powerdns.com/