Re: [dns-privacy] review of draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles-11: we should revert DNSSEC validation requirement

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Mon, 30 October 2017 13:34 UTC

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Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 14:34:03 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] review of draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles-11: we should revert DNSSEC validation requirement
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On Fri, Oct 27, 2017 at 11:40:15PM -0400,
 Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote 
 a message of 219 lines which said:

> I do not believe that DNSSEC validation is warranted as a mitigation
> against an active attacker in the context of an opportunistic
> metaquery,

I see the point but it seems to me a small detail in a 29-pages
document. So, IMHO, it should not cause yet another long delay for a
draft that already lingered too much.

> But i think the other changes between draft-10 and draft-11 are
> unwarranted and should be reverted.

There are very few changes and, except the DNSSEC *requirment*, they
seem good to me. I agree with Sara "I really do think a description
there of the trade-offs of DNSSEC validation are warranted".