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Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Possible use case: Opportunistic encryption for recursive to authoritative

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Thu, 06 August 2020 15:33 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: "dprive@ietf.org" <dprive@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] [dns-privacy] Possible use case: Opportunistic encryption for recursive to authoritative
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Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 15:32:43 +0000
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Possible use case: Opportunistic encryption for recursive to authoritative
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On Aug 6, 2020, at 8:18 AM, Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> I think opportunistic or unauthenticated encryption is worth pursuing.  

Thanks.

> However, your quote also says "use authentication when possible", and I agree.  I would like to avoid selecting an opportunistic encryption design that doesn't match well with our authenticated encryption design, so I think that means we need to develop them together.

Fully agree. For every use case we adopt, the instantiation of it should not prevent other use cases from working well.

--Paul Hoffman

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