[dns-privacy] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-03.txt

[Paul Hoffman <[e-mail]>]

Greetings again. Based on the request of the WG during last week's meeting, I have updated my draft to flesh out some of the ideas we discussed. As noted in the abstract and in the body of the draft, this version only proposes using pot-checking for discovery, even though that is not likely to be the final proposal.

For those of you interested in the use case described in the document, please review and discuss how this might be improved.

For those of you not interested in the use case described in the document, there was a few pleas during the WG meeting for fleshed-out drafts on fully authenticated encryption for DNS.

--Paul Hoffman


A new version of I-D, draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by Paul Hoffman and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic
Revision:	03
Title:		Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Opportunistic Encryption
Document date:	2020-11-25
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		9
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-03.txt 
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic/ 
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-03 
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-pp-recursive-authoritative-opportunistic-03 

Abstract:
  This document describes a use case and a method for a DNS recursive
  resolver to use opportunistic encryption (that is, encryption with
  optional authentication) when communicating with authoritative
  servers.  The motivating use case for this method is that more
  encryption on the Internet is better, and opportunistic encryption is
  better than no encryption at all.  The method here is optional for
  both the recursive resolver and the authoritative server.  Nothing in
  this method prevents use cases and methods that require authenticated
  encryption.

  IMPORTANT NOTE: This version of the document describes discovery
  whether an authoritative server supports encryption using port-
  checking.  This restriction is based on the request of the DPRIVE WG
  during its meeting at IETF 109.  It is quite likely that the final
  protocol will include a better set of methods for such discovery.