Re: [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: (with COMMENT)
Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com> Tue, 22 March 2022 09:40 UTC
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From: Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com>
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Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2022 09:40:21 +0000
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic@ietf.org, dprive-chairs@ietf.org, dns-privacy@ietf.org, brian@innovationslab.net
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To: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: (with COMMENT)
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> On 9 Mar 2022, at 17:41, Martin Duke via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: No Objection > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ > for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for this draft! It was very easy to read. Hi Martin, Many thanks for the comments - please see the updates in version -11 which was just published, which we hope address your comments. > > (4.3) says: > > "Using QUIC might allow a protocol to disguise its purpose from devices on the > network path using encryption and traffic analysis resistance techniques like > padding. This specification does not include any measures that are designed to > avoid such classification." > > but then Sec 6.4 has a detailed, normative discussion of how to use padding to > avoid classification. I suggest you delete or edit the bit in 4.3. We’ve update the last sentence to be: “This specification does not include any measures that are designed to avoid such classification -- the padding mechanisms defined in {{padding}} are intended to obfuscate the specific records contained in DNS queries and responses, but not the fact that this is DNS traffic." > > (5.3.1) Clients are allowed to send STOP_SENDING and servers are allowed to > send RESET_STREAM. Servers sending STOP_SENDING break the connection. Given the > prescriptiveness of these rules, it's odd that you don't address clients > sending RESET_STREAM. IMO this should be allowed, but either way it should be > specified. We’ve added an additional paragraph at the end of this section to try to address this - please review. > > (6.5.4) and (9.4) I hesitate to write this, as Christian is as well aware as > anyone, but IMO QUIC address migration is not quite as privacy-destroying as > this draft suggests. RFC9000 has a number of normative requirements to reduce > linkability, and work is ongoing to reduce it further. Granted, no > anti-linkability mitigation is perfect, and if this is a primary goal of DoQ > it's OK to discourage migration as you've done here. As I think you discussed with Christian, the issue being addressed is actually about disclosing the client location to the server. Best regards Sara.
- [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft… Martin Duke via Datatracker
- Re: [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on d… Sara Dickinson
- Re: [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on d… Martin Duke