[dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: (with COMMENT)

Martin Duke via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 09 March 2022 17:41 UTC

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Subject: [dns-privacy] Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: (with COMMENT)
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Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thanks for this draft! It was very easy to read.

(4.3) says:

"Using QUIC might allow a protocol to disguise its purpose from devices on the
network path using encryption and traffic analysis resistance techniques like
padding. This specification does not include any measures that are designed to
avoid such classification."

but then Sec 6.4 has a detailed, normative discussion of how to use padding to
avoid classification. I suggest you delete or edit the bit in 4.3.

(5.3.1) Clients are allowed to send STOP_SENDING and servers are allowed to
send RESET_STREAM. Servers sending STOP_SENDING break the connection. Given the
prescriptiveness of these rules, it's odd that you don't address clients
sending RESET_STREAM. IMO this should be allowed, but either way it should be
specified.

(6.5.4) and (9.4) I hesitate to write this, as Christian is as well aware as
anyone, but IMO QUIC address migration is not quite as privacy-destroying as
this draft suggests. RFC9000 has a number of normative requirements to reduce
linkability, and work is ongoing to reduce it further. Granted, no
anti-linkability mitigation is perfect, and if this is a primary goal of DoQ
it's OK to discourage migration as you've done here.