[dns-privacy] "A Study of Privacy and Anonymity in the DNS"

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Fri, 02 September 2016 07:47 UTC

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Date: Fri, 02 Sep 2016 09:47:09 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Subject: [dns-privacy] "A Study of Privacy and Anonymity in the DNS"
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At the next OARC workshop:

https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/25/session/5/contribution/26

 A Study of Privacy and Anonymity in the DNS
Speakers

    Christopher WOOD

Primary authors

    Christopher WOOD (UCI)

Co-authors

    Prof. Gene TSUDIK (UCI)
    Cesar GHALI (Google)

Content

The need for a private Domain Name System (DNS) has become
increasingly important in recent years. There are several different
proposals to address this growing problem, including DNS-over-TLS and
DNSCurve. The former enables clients to create ephemeral sessions with
either their resolver or authoritative (stub) servers in which queries
can be issued. The latter uses per-query encryption to protect queries
between clients and servers. Encryption is core mechanism used to
enable client privacy in both of these solutions. However, in a recent
study, Shulman showed that encryption alone is insufficient to protect
the privacy of queries. Information leaked in DNS side channels, such
query timing, frequency, and resolution ``chains,'' may reveal the
contents of a query. Moreover, by observing the trust properties of
DNS servers and their responses, an adversary may also learn the
specific record within a domain that was requested.

[...]