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Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Revised opportunistic encryption draft

Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> Wed, 18 November 2020 19:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 19:50:40 +0000
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
cc: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>, "dprive@ietf.org" <dprive@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Revised opportunistic encryption draft
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Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 3:30 PM Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:
> >
> > Even so I think delegations should be signed.
>
> So, the parental NS records are not authoritative, and thus not supposed to
> be signed.

Yes, that was the logic, but it was a mistake :-)

> The signer field would differ between the delegation RRSIG and the apex
> RRSIG (on what would otherwise be very similar RRSETs).

Yes, like RRSIG(NSEC).

A change of this kind would need an algorithm bump to indicate support for
the new semantics, like the bump from 5 to 7 to indicate support for
NSEC3. This has the caveat that a signer will want to wait for a large
enough proportion of validators to upgrade to support the new algorithms
before the signer bumps its algorithm, because old validators will treat
the new algorithms as insecure.

> And I'm not sure whether the DPRIVE use case is enough of a "new
> requirement" to justify changing the spec. But I think that is open to
> consideration at least.

Yes, that's why I'm talking about it :-)

Tony.
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