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Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-schwartz-dprive-name-signal-00.txt

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Thu, 10 June 2021 18:37 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: "dprive@ietf.org" <dprive@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] [dns-privacy] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-schwartz-dprive-name-signal-00.txt
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Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 18:37:32 +0000
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-schwartz-dprive-name-signal-00.txt
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On Jun 10, 2021, at 11:35 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>> We propose that this be the actual,
>> long-term solution.
> 
> I understand the desire but I don’t agree as this signal is insecure, and foresee TLDs abusing this as potential nation state monitor / privacy leak.

Please say more. I don't see how this proposal leaks anything that could not be trivially determined by probing.

> It is also dangerous when used via resolvers.

Please say more. To me, it is only useful for resolvers.

> I still prefer something with DS than can be signed, and validated by the child as their intend via CDS. With transparency monitoring.
> 
> If we are using overloading, might as well overload securely.

If you write up a draft, I'm happy to send responses to particular statements in the draft. I don't see how such a DS could be specified in a way that would get more than a trivial amount of deployment. I would be happy to be wrong, given that DS is signed in the parent.

--Paul Hoffman

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