Re: [dns-privacy] how can we ADoT?

[Peter van Dijk <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, 2020-11-18 at 23:09 +0000, Tony Finch wrote:
> > >   * Authenticate the server by `subjectAltName` `iPAddress`. [snip]
> > 
> > For DOTPIN, Ralph Dolmans had the bright insight to suggest not sending
> > a server name at all (which matches what I said earlier - name servers
> > have IPs, not really names).
> 
> Do you mean not sending in TLS SNI? Yes, that would make sense if we're
> not doing name-based auth.

Yes.

> > >   * Ignore certificate name mismatches, and authenticate just the public
> > >     key. [snip]
> > 
> > As above. (Not saying that it is the only way, but 'a name server has
> > no name' has a lot of convenient properties.)
> 
> There's another downside to this case: with IP-based or name-based auth,
> you can put the CA's public key in the TLSA rather than the server key, so
> there's less rollover churn, but that doesn't make sense for key-based
> auth.

Ah, of course. Then you have the downsides of TLSA with the downsides
of DOTPIN.

> I think there are significant (albeit woolly) advantages to staying as
> close as possible to normal webPKI for DoT: much lower congnitive load for
> operators who can reuse their https knowledge; deveopers don't have to
> write code that's too weirdly different from https; very straightforward
> parallel deployment for DoT, DoH, DoQ (if we ever want to support more
> transports).

That makes sense.

Kind regards,
-- 
Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS.COM BV - https://www.powerdns.com/