Re: [dns-privacy] review of draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles-11: we should revert DNSSEC validation requirement

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 31 October 2017 18:39 UTC

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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Sara Dickinson <sara@sinodun.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] review of draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles-11: we should revert DNSSEC validation requirement
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Hiya,

On 31/10/17 15:12, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> On 31 Oct 2017, at 8:06, Sara Dickinson wrote:
> 
>> So maybe “A DNSSEC validating client SHOULD apply the same validation
>> policy to the A/AAAA meta-query lookup as it does to other queries.”?
> 
> That could be misinterpreted to indicate that there has to be some
> positive validation policy. How about:
>    A DNSSEC validating client SHOULD apply the same validation policy
>    to the A/AAAA meta-query lookup as it does to other queries.
>    A client that does not validate DNSSEC SHOULD apply any policy it
>    has to the A/AAAA meta-query lookup.

So I think either of the above could be ok.

The main thing for me is that we do not insist that a server
has to get DNSSEC setup before they can do opportunistic DNS
security. I think the above is ok in that respect.

Just checking: I think that means that with the opportunistic
profile, only servers that have DNSSEC setup and where the
client validates and gets a badly signed response would be
affected, all other cases would still get DNS privacy of some
sort. If that's right, I can live with it.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> --Paul Hoffman
> 
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