Re: [dnsext] DNSSEC, robustness, and several DS records

Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com> Wed, 11 May 2011 13:39 UTC

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Date: Wed, 11 May 2011 09:45:38 -0400
From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>
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To: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] DNSSEC, robustness, and several DS records
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Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> A recent incident lead me to re-study the question of "what a
> validating resolver must/should do when there are several DS and some
> are invalid in some way?" AFAIK (I would be glad to be corrected
> here), the best common practice is to be lax ("DNSSEC is hard enough,
> accept any DS"), following RFC 4035, section 2.4 and 5.3.1.
> 
> But it seems there is an "exception". RFC 4509, section 3, says that
> DS hashed with SHA-1 must be ignored when there is a DS for the same
> key hashed with SHA-2. This is to avoid downgrade attacks.
> 
> In the incident I was talking about, there were two DS for the same
> KSK key, one hashed with SHA-1 and one with SHA-256 and the second one
> was invalid, because of a bug (wrong Algorithm field). As a result,
> both BIND and Unbound, following RFC 4509, returned a SERVFAIL, while
> there was another and perfectly valid DS record.
> 
> I question this rule: SHA-1 (as it is used for DNSSEC) is not broken
> and the risk of downgrade attacks is ridiculous when you compare, both
> to the other attacks on DNSSEC, and to the risk of creating an
> error. Isn't it a case of excess security, which will turn people away
> from DNSSEC (too much risk of breakage)?

Yes, it is such a case.

-- 
- Thierry Moreau