Re: [dnsext] historal root keys for upgrade path?

Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> Mon, 31 January 2011 19:29 UTC

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Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 15:32:20 -0400
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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] historal root keys for upgrade path?
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On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 3:23 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Brian Dickson
> <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:

>> The simplest bootstrap method would be to have a series of BSK
>> (bootstrap keys), created on a periodic basis (every N years), and
>> used as follows:
>
> If a compromise has occurred then the first thing to ask would be why.
> There are only three places where a compromise can logically occur - in the
> cryptographic algorithm, in the cryptographic hardware manufacturer or in
> ICANN,

No, there is a fourth place: brute force attack on the key/signature,
to find the key.

The brute force success on one key, compromises that key only, plus
any data signed by it or derived therefrom.

If another key of the same algorithm, held in the same hardware and
operated by the same party exists, but is not dependent upon the first
key, it remains secure.

Brian