Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DNAME/CNAME
Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz> Mon, 13 October 2008 16:51 UTC
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Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2008 12:44:43 -0400
To: Michael StJohns <mstjohns@comcast.net>
From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
Subject: Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DNAME/CNAME
Cc: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 12:30 -0400 10/13/08, Michael StJohns wrote: >Hi Ed - > >I agree that you can determine the security state of X and the security >state of Y by examining trust anchors, dlv etc. But that's not the question. >The question is "What is the security state of the compound answer XY?" The security state - in the eyes of DNS that is easy. If the X passes the DNSSEC test, Y passes the test as being unsigned, and Z passes the DNSSEC test, the answer is "AD." IOW, there's nothing suspicious about the result as far as the DNS is concerned. It's fair to ask though "what's the value" of piecemeal checking. My answer is that "it's out of scope" for DNS. > From Marc Andrew's and somewhat from Wouter's email, it could be a new >state "unauthenticated" - because the response out of an intermediate resolver >is to return the data but not set the AD bit. I say new, because it's >different than unknown, secure, and bogus and wouldn't be returned for the >same reasons that you would return it for unsecure data under a single trust >anchor. But even that begs the question of what an application should do >with it. > >Later, Mike After the debate in Winter 2001 (SLC IETF) over the AD bit not being tied to cryptography, I'd set the AD bit in the response. I(f i)t's authenticated to the responding server. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Edward Lewis +1-571-434-5468 NeuStar Never confuse activity with progress. Activity pays more. -- to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body. archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
- [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one week Andrew Sullivan
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Scott Rose
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC (Was: [dnsext] Remind… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- [dnsext] Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC Wes Hardaker
- Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC (Was: [dnsext] Re… Edward Lewis
- [dnsext] recommeded contents for Re: DNAME (and C… Edward Lewis
- [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DNAME/… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] recommeded contents for Re: DNAME (a… Scott Rose
- [dnsext] Re: DNAME (and CNAME) vs DNSSEC Wes Hardaker
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… John Dickinson
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Florian Weimer
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Mark Andrews
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Florian Weimer
- Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closing in one we… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Edward Lewis
- the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC closin… Edward Lewis
- Re: the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC cl… bmanning
- Re: the DO bit Re: [dnsext] Reminder: two WGLC cl… David Conrad
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Wouter Wijngaards
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Alex Bligh
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Ben Laurie
- CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure a… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Shane Kerr
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Alex Bligh
- Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-floppin… Edward Lewis
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Alex Bligh
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secure and unsecure DN… Michael StJohns
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Edward Lewis
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: CNAME/DNAME - Re: [dnsext] flip-flopping secu… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Nicholas Weaver
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Mark Andrews
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Wouter Wijngaards
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Ben Laurie
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Mark Andrews
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Michael StJohns
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: Interpreting DNSSEC was Re: [dnsext] flip-flo… Edward Lewis