Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update to Proposed Standard
Thomas Narten <narten@raleigh.ibm.com> Thu, 08 June 2000 04:31 UTC
Received: from psg.com ([147.28.0.62]) by ietf.org (8.9.1a/8.9.1a) with ESMTP id AAA26882 for <dnsext-archive@lists.ietf.org>; Thu, 8 Jun 2000 00:31:27 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from lserv by psg.com with local (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12ztLP-0000A1-00 for namedroppers-data@psg.com; Wed, 07 Jun 2000 20:50:59 -0700
Received: from [147.28.4.2] (helo=roam.psg.com) by psg.com with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12ztLM-00009r-00 for namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; Wed, 07 Jun 2000 20:50:57 -0700
Received: from randy by roam.psg.com with local (Exim 3.12 #1) id 12ztLL-0000tv-00 for namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; Wed, 07 Jun 2000 23:50:55 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <200006072110.RAA01300@hygro.adsl.duke.edu>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update to Proposed Standard
In-Reply-To: Message from Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com> of "Tue, 06 Jun 2000 13:12:18 EDT." <4.1.20000606113353.00b5b570@localhost>
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2000 17:10:28 -0400
From: Thomas Narten <narten@raleigh.ibm.com>
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
> "Domain Name System Security Signing Authority" is a minor update to > RFC2535 it restricts the set of keys that can sign DNS data to zone > keys at APEX. This is a great simplification that is only possible > as RFC2137 is obsoleted by the other draft. RFC2137 requires that > other keys can sign data. Having now dug deeper (as I should have done before sending my first note!), I agree that 2535 is just updated. > I thought Historic status is reserved for documents that are not replaced by > any other document. But in this case the protocol change is significant > enough to warrant moving RFC2137 to historic and consider the new one a > new protocol ? Take a look at 2026 for guidelines. The paragraph I find most compelling here is: > 6.4 Retiring a Standard > > As the technology changes and matures, it is possible for a new > Standard specification to be so clearly superior technically that one > or more existing standards track specifications for the same function > should be retired. In this case, or when it is felt for some other > reason that an existing standards track specification should be > retired, the IESG shall approve a change of status of the old > specification(s) to Historic. This recommendation shall be issued > with the same Last-Call and notification procedures used for any > other standards action. A request to retire an existing standard can > originate from a Working Group, an Area Director or some other > interested party. If the message we want to send is "don't implement 2137", reclassifying it as historic would seem stronger. "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com> writes: > I think of Historic as being for a protocol that has fallen from use > or been replaced by a completely new protocol, not for a stage in > the evolution of the same protocol (although such judgements are no > doubt in the eye of the beholder). Reclassifying a document historic is also done to send a message. I.e., RIP version 1 was reclassified to historic despite widespread use precisely because RIP version 2 was what we wanted folks to implement. > I think someone reading > draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-01.txt should have RFC 2137 > for comparison rather than having RFC 2137 already on the trash > heap, although I have no doubt that almsot all will still prefer the > new draft. What I'm hearing from these messages is that we don't want to give implementors a choice as to which to implement. We want them to implement the new ID. Reclassifying the document historic doesn't prevent people from reading it. Thomas to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Edward Lewis
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Thomas Narten
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Olafur Gudmundsson
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Thomas Narten
- RE: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Levon Esibov
- Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Terry Lambert
- RE: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Brian Wellington
- RE: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Edward Lewis
- RE: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Levon Esibov
- RE: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (… Harald Tveit Alvestrand