Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications

Miek Gieben <miek@miek.nl> Mon, 28 March 2011 16:12 UTC

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Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2011 18:13:35 +0200
From: Miek Gieben <miek@miek.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Possible DNSSECbis clarifications
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[ Quoting Marc Lampo at 17:55 on March 28 in "Re: [dnsext] Possible  DNSSECbis cl"... ]
> A "theorical" attack would be a "man-in-the-middle" change the trailing
> SOA, thus causing the secondary server to throw away each zone transfer it
> attempts (if it "believes" the second SOA is correct, in the absence of a
> valid RRSIG for it - that trailing SOA).

If you are scared of mitm attacks you should use tsig to secure the
transfer IMO.

grtz Miek