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Re: [dnsext] DNSSEC, robustness, and several DS records

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Thu, 12 May 2011 08:00 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 09:55:46 +0200
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net>
Message-ID: <20110512075546.GA17883@nic.fr>
References: <201105112250.p4BMoQZk020211@givry.fdupont.fr> <4DCB2E3F.4030701@dougbarton.us> <20110512015806.209E0EAF182@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4DCB4421.5020306@dougbarton.us> <1305174244.2793.8.camel@localhost>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] DNSSEC, robustness, and several DS records
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On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 12:24:04AM -0400,
 Matt McCutchen <matt@mattmccutchen.net> wrote 
 a message of 25 lines which said:

> The question is what the resolver should do if it gets a DNSKEY that
> matches a SHA-1 DS but doesn't match any SHA-256 DS.  It has no way
> to distinguish a mistake in the SHA-256 DS data in the original zone
> from a downgrade attack.

Can you explain how such an attack could be possible? Since the DS
record set is signed, modifying the SHA-256 record to make it invalid
(so the bad guy can attack SHA-1 with clever cryptanalysis) is not
possible (unless the bad guy can attack the provisioning channel and,
in this case, you're toasted, whatever the RFC says).

[Doug Barton already made more or less the same argument, if I
understand him correctly.]

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