Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update to Proposed Standard

Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com> Fri, 02 June 2000 15:28 UTC

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Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2000 10:05:47 -0400
To: iesg@ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Last Call: Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update to Proposed Standard
Cc: lewis@tislabs.com, brian.wellington@nominum.com, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 8:34 AM -0400 6/2/00, The IESG wrote:
>The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
>iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by June 16, 2000.

Regarding the "Signing Authority" draft:

>1 - Introduction
>
>...  The intent
>is to establish a standard policy followed by a secure resolver; this
>policy can be augmented by local rules.

I have been pushing for a "canonical" means of validating DNSSEC data, and
this document reflects what I believe to be a manageable first-cut at an
maintainable policy.  However, this policy is rather conservative, which
means that although security is high, brittleness is high too.  (Meaning
that if part of the secured DNS is unavailable, data below it can't be
secure - the policy is susceptible to tears and rips in the tree.)

Restricting the initial policy is necessary in order to make the software
implementable.  By having software released and in use, we have the
opportunity to assess in what ways a policy is needed to be more flexible
and relaxed yet still afford us the required safety.

I suggest this be done to the document.  I would like a note to be added to
the introduction that states that this draft "defines a first-cut policy.
It is anticipated that the policy will be modified given operational
experience,"  or some such words to that effect.  I think this will deflect
some of the discussion that this policy may be too harsh for operations.

P.S. The section of RFC 2535 most affected by this is 6 (6.3.1), even more
so that 2.3.6 (as mentioned in the introduction).

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

"It takes years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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