[dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6672 (8677)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 12 December 2025 15:55 UTC

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Subject: [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6672 (8677)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6672,
"DNAME Redirection in the DNS".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8677

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Type: Technical
Reported by: Petr Špaček <pspacek@isc.org>

Section: 8

Original Text
-------------
<missing text>

Corrected Text
--------------
DNAME redirects can be used to amplify the impact of successfully spoofing a
single DNS response. An attacker can generate an arbitrary query name in the
form of "$random.example." and simultaneously try to spoof a response. The
"$random" label provides the attacker with an unlimited number of spoof
attempts. A successful spoofing can include a DNAME RR with a QNAME's parent
name. Such a spoofed RR can redirect the whole parent zone to a malicious
target, or create a resolution loop.

Consumers of DNS responses might consider the trustworthiness of DNAME RRs: Are
they DNSSEC-secure? Were they received via a non-spoofable transport (TCP, TLS,
UDP with DNS cookies, etc.)? Depending on security posture, consumers might
choose to not use untrustworthy DNAME RRs, or choose to re-query using a secure
transport like TCP.


Notes
-----
I believe Security Considerations should mention higher risk associated with DNAME spoofing. Hardening described in the proposed text was deployed as (part of) fix for CVE-2025-40778 in BIND 9.

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RFC6672 (draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-26)
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Title               : DNAME Redirection in the DNS
Publication Date    : June 2012
Author(s)           : S. Rose, W. Wijngaards
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : DNS Extensions
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG